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User charges have emerged as one of the major revenue sources for municipal 
governments in the United States since the late 1970s. Meanwhile, a majority of states 
have adopted tax and expenditure limitations (TELs) in an attempt to constrain the 
revenue and spending levels of local governments including municipalities. In the era of 
TELs, how user charges perform their multiple roles in promoting local autonomy, 
political accountability, allocative efficiency, horizontal equity, and responsive 
government deserves considerable attention in the field of public finance. This 
dissertation explores the causes and consequences of the increased use of user charges by 
American municipalities.  
First, I provide an overview of fiscal trends in American municipalities. Chapter 1 
discusses the context in which municipal revenue policy is made, the definitions of user 
charges, the salience of the issue, and the aims and organization of the dissertation. 
  
Chapter 2 investigates the effect of TELs on municipal reliance on user charges. 
The analysis is based on a sample of 724 cities for the period of 1970 to 2004. I employ 
fixed effects regression techniques to help control for the unobserved city-level 
characteristics that vary across cities but are time invariant. Results indicate that the 
implementation of TELs leads to a substantial increase in per capita user charges. The 
effect becomes even more pronounced when the endogoneity of TELs is taken into 
account using a two-stage least squares model. This finding implies that TELs may have 
unintended consequences and lead to a bigger government. Results also suggest that the 
restrictiveness and the number of TELs make a difference and different types of TELs 
generate varying effects on user charge reliance. 
Chapter 3 examines the impact of user charge financing on municipal expenditure 
levels. Using a panel of 686 cities for the sewer service and 715 cities for the parks and 
recreation service between 1972 and 2004, I find strong evidence that a greater reliance 
on user charges to finance government services leads to a reduction in municipal 
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Chapter 1: Overview of Fiscal Trends in Municipalities 
Municipalities play an essential role in the American federal system shaping the 
lives of local residents in nearly every social, economic and political aspect. According to 
the 2007 Census of Governments, there are 19,431 municipalities in the United States, in 
which nearly 175 million people or 61% of the U.S. total population reside (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2005). Municipal governments, which include cities, towns, boroughs and 
villages,1 provide education, hospital care, public health and welfare programs, police 
and fire protection, sewerage and sanitation, basic transportation infrastructure, and 
numerous other public services. Years of public opinion polling show that many 
Americans favor local governments, including municipal governments, more than either 
the federal or state government and believe that local governments provide more services 
for their tax dollar than these higher levels of government (Conlan, 1998; Kincaid & 
Cole, 2001). Despite the considerable public support given to local governments, 
reductions in federal aid, regional recessions, and the adoption of tax and expenditure 
limitations (TELs) by state governments have put considerable obstacles to the traditional 
revenue sources of municipal governments—principally property taxes and 
intergovernmental revenue. In order to continue financing local public services, user 
charges have emerged as a salient source of municipal revenue. Accordingly, the 
implementation of user charges appears particularly appealing to municipal 
                                                 
1 For Census Bureau statistics, municipal governments are defined as political subdivisions within which a 
municipal corporation has been established to provide general services for a specific population 
concentration in a defined area. This includes all sub-county general purpose governmental units officially 
designated as cities, boroughs (except in Alaska), towns (except in the six New England states, Minnesota, 
New York, and Wisconsin), and villages. For simplicity, this study uses “city” as an interchangeable term 





administrators who seek to maximize necessary public services while maintaining fiscal 
and political accountability. Indeed, user charge is one of the few areas in which most 
municipal governments can still autonomously exercise their taxing authority without 
significant state government interventions—although in some places (e.g., Colorado and 
Michigan) user charges do face legal constraints and increasing resistance from the local 
public (Reed, 1999).  
As a result of these fiscal challenges and with public demands for greater 
accountability on the part of public officials, municipal government reliance on user 
charges has increased significantly over the past several decades. As of 2002, user 
charges accounted for 42% of municipal total own-source revenue while property taxes 
only generated 23% of total own-source revenue for municipalities in the United States, 
compared with 33% versus 37% in 1972 (see Figure 1.1). In other words, for every $1 in 
property taxes collected, municipal governments, on average, received $1.83 in revenue 
from user charges in 2002, compared with $0.89 in 1972. In addition,  per capita 
municipal user charges in real terms have been almost doubled over the past three 
decades (U.S. Census Bureau, 1978, 2005).  
 
1.1 Context of Municipal Revenue Policy 
In principle, a municipal revenue structure should address four key concerns: (1) a 
municipal government revenue structure should reflect the preferences of the citizens 
within the jurisdiction; (2) a municipal government revenue structure must provide a 
stable and reliable source of funds; (3) a municipal government revenue structure must 




promote cost efficiency (Bland, 2005). In practice, however, municipal revenue policies 
are significantly shaped by the ever-changing political and economic environment in 
which they operate. Since the end of World War II, many municipal governments have 
experienced several major challenges, challenges that have forced them to alter their 
revenue structures. 
Perhaps the most profound challenge confronting municipalities is tax revolts. 
Anti-tax sentiments, of course, are not new in the American political experience. But at 
the heart of these contemporary revolts is a strange paradox. Although public opinion 
polls consistently indicate that citizens regard local governments as making the most of 
their tax dollars, the polls also reveal a long-standing distrust of government on the part 
of average citizens (Bland, 2005). During the period of stagflation, American citizens 
became even more skeptical of government. California’s Proposition 13 (in 1978) and 
Massachusetts’ Proposition 2 ½ (in 1980) are two of the most prominent tax revolts in 
recent American history. In response, many state governments imposed TELs on local 
governments, including municipalities, restricting local discretion in raising property 
taxes or increasing spending levels. As of 2004, 46 states have implemented certain 
forms of TELs on local governments, of which, 42 states have limitations on their 
municipalities (Mullins & Wallin, 2004). As a result of these limitations, many local 
government officials are hesitant to raise property tax collections for fear of provoking a 
citizen reaction like the Proposition 13 tax revolt or of driving businesses and households 
away into lower tax jurisdictions. This is true even when there are no legally established 




In addition to the tax revolt challenge, demographic changes are proving to be a 
significant challenge for municipal governments. At the beginning of the 21st century, 
property tax revenue is in considerable jeopardy due to a rapidly aging population. As a 
result of longer life spans and declining birth rates, the U.S. senior population is projected 
to reach 71.5 million or 20% of total population by 2030 (U.S. Administration on Aging, 
2006). Traditionally, senior citizens have been averse toward property taxes because real 
estate values often increases at a faster rate than does income, which, in turn, imposes a 
greater property tax burden for elderly homeowners on fixed incomes (Brunori, 2003). 
Current property tax relief programs such as “circuit breakers” (i.e., limiting the amount 
of property taxes paid based upon current family income), homestead exemptions, and 
deferrals help to temporarily alleviate this situation, but these approaches do not 
constitute a long-term solution for revenue requirements in a society characterized by a 
rapidly aging population.  
Besides tremendous pressure from local residents, municipal revenues are also 
challenged by the policy of the upper level governments—namely, the “New Federalism” 
movement. New Federalism, also known as “devolution revolution” or “fend-for-
yourself” federalism, was first introduced by President Richard Nixon in the 1970s as an 
attempt to devolve national programs and policy priorities to state and local governments 
(Conlan, 1988; Krane, 1990). This initiative was later adopted and expanded by the 
Reagan Administration as part of a broader strategy to reduce the role of government at 
all levels. In the 1990s, the Clinton Administration’s National Performance Review 
(NPR) and the Republican Congress’ “Contract with America” attempted to continue the 




implementation down to the states, as did President George W. Bush’s three tax cuts 
since 2001 (Anders & Shook, 2003). As a consequence, federal aid to municipal 
governments diminished significantly from about 15% of municipal government total 
general revenue in 1977 to 5% in 1988 and remained in this proportion until 2002. The 
total amount and per capita amount (in real terms) of federal aid to municipal 
governments also declined during this period, although at a less dramatic rate than the 
percentage change. In contrast, during the same period, state aid to municipal 
governments showed a steady increase in terms of absolute real values (total amount and 
per capita amount), which offset the loss of federal aid. However, the percentage share of 
state aid in municipal general revenue remained around 21% over the years (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 1967-2004). This trend implies that municipal governments have collected more 
revenues from their own sources rather than heavily relying on upper level government 
assistance. This shift may be driven by the overall increasing cost of providing public 
services, requirement of matching fund to the state grants, and/or growing awareness of 
the importance of local fiscal autonomy among local government officials. 
In addition to continuing citizen resistance to property taxes and declining federal 
aid, increasing economic uncertainty caused by business cycles has further challenged 
and, accordingly, changed municipal revenue structures. Moreover, as the U.S. economy 
is moving away from manufacturing sector towards information and service based 
economy, municipal revenue bases are drying up further. That is, municipal governments, 
as with states, are losing sales tax revenues from tangible goods and find themselves in 
need of capturing revenue from intangible goods and services and internet sales. 




avoid fiscal crises caused by economic recessions, cities need to maintain a stable 
revenue system which depends in a large part on the degree of diversification in both tax 
bases and revenue sources (National Advisory Council on State and Local Budgeting 
(NACSLB), 1998; U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR), 
1987). All these challenges have intensified the intergovernmental competition between 
municipalities. Many municipal administrators are willing to lower tax burdens and 
provide certain economic incentives in order to lure business investments to their 





While the term “user charges” has been widely used by governments and 
scholars, there is no universal agreement on what exactly should be included in the 
concept. In a narrow sense, user charges are prices charged by governments for 
voluntarily purchased and publicly provided goods or services that are closely associated 
with basic government responsibilities (Mikesell, 2007). Common examples of state and 
local user charges include, but are not limited to, air transportation charges, public school 
and college tuition, public hospital charges, highway tolls, parking fees, parks and 
recreation charges, solid waste management charges, and sewerage charges. Some 
scholars argue that regulatory fees and utility revenues should be excluded from the list 
of user charges in that regulatory fees are paid for privileges granted by governments (not 
publicly provided goods or services) and utility revenues are public prices levied on pure 




assessments, though related to public goods, are also excluded either because their 
primary use is to finance infrastructure and not to pay for current government services or 
because they are purchased compulsorily (i.e., not voluntarily) (Zorn, 1991). 
In a broad sense, however, user charges refer to prices charged by governments 
not only for utilizing specific services but also for the privilege of undertaking some 
activities (Fisher, 2007). By this definition, license and permit fees, impact fees and 
special assessments can also be classified as user charges. Furthermore, the now defunct 
United States Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) and several 
scholars also include utility revenues into their research on user charges, thus extending 
the term toward a much broader understanding.2 
For working purposes, this study employs a definition of user charges that 
includes what the Census Bureau calls “current charges” and “utility revenues.” 
According to the Census Bureau, “current charges” are charges imposed for providing 
current services that benefit the person charged and for the sale of products in connection 
with general government activities such as highway tolls and sewerage charges, while 
“utility revenues” are receipts from sales and directly related services and by-products of 
water supply, electric power, gas supply, and public mass transit systems. These utility 
systems “must be either owned and operated by a government, or owned and operated 
under contract by a private firm where the government maintains day-to-day financial 
oversight” (U.S. Census Bureau, 2006, pp. 2-1). License and permit fees are categorized 
as taxes, while impact fees and special assessments are reported as miscellaneous general 
revenues (including proceeds from sale of property, interest earnings, fines and forfeits, 
rents and royalties, etc.) by the Census Bureau, and thus, are excluded from this study.  
                                                 




By including current charges and utility revenues into the study of user charges, it 
is possible to avoid some of the inherent ambiguities in defining benefit-related charges. 
The working definition proposed here reflects a common distinguishing characteristic of 
these revenue sources; that is, they both are voluntary payments based on direct and 
measureable consumption of publicly provided goods and services. These types of goods 
may come in several forms. For instance, these goods could be pure private goods such as 
power, gas and water utilities that governments choose to provide or regulate with the 
intention of protecting the general public from the manipulation of natural monopolies 
(assuming that government itself does not exploit its position). Or these goods could be 
merit goods such as after-school recreation programs which are enjoyed by identifiable 
individuals but generate benefits that could spill over to the community at large (e.g., 
reducing juvenile delinquency). Finally, these types of goods could be toll goods, such as 
certain highways and bridges that are exclusive to toll payers but no one individual’s use 
of the goods detracts from anyone else’s benefit. All in all, the beneficiaries of the 
government services financed by these types of charges are identifiable individuals, 
rather than the general public, and non-payers could be excluded from receiving the 
benefits of these services (ACIR, 1987).  
Other related concepts are defined as follows. “Total revenue,” based on the 
Census Bureau’s classifications with modification, includes general revenue (taxes, 
intergovernmental revenue, current charges, and miscellaneous general revenue) and 
utility revenue. “Total own-source revenue” comprises general own-source revenue 
(taxes, current charges, and miscellaneous general revenue) and utility revenue. These 




in this study. Liquor stores revenue and social insurance trust revenue (including 
retirement and social insurance contributions and net earnings on investments for 
insurance trusts) are excluded from the study due to their unique nature (related to special 
government services), minimal magnitudes (accounting for approximately 2% of total 
municipal revenue from all sources), and little relevance to the research topic.3 
In addition, it is essential to clarify that tax and expenditure limitations can be 
authorized or enforced at different levels of government. “State-level TELs” are TELs 
that are imposed on the state government by the state itself. As of 2008, 30 states had at 
least one type of such TELs restricting state spending levels (23 states), or revenue levels 
(four states), or both (three states) (Waisanen, 2008). “State-imposed TELs” refer to 
those tax and expenditure limitations that are imposed on local governments and 
authorized by the state. Additionally, several local governments also operate under 
“locally-imposed TELs.” These are TELs that are put into practice in order to provide a 
degree of self-regulation on the part of the local government in question (Brooks & 
Phillips, 2009). The last two levels of TELs are especially important for municipalities. 
The focus of the study is on state-imposed TELs, and thus the following use of the term 
“TELs” will refer to this level of TELs only, unless otherwise specified. 
 
1.3 Salience of User Charges 
As indicated, increased reliance on municipal user charges is widely perceived as 
a result of tax and expenditure limitations, federal fiscal devolution, and demographic and 
                                                 
3 Liquor stores revenue, by Census definition, refers to revenues generated from sale of goods and 
associated services and products (excluding license fees and liquor taxes) in liquor stores owned and 
operated by local governments. As of 2005, local governments in only seven states collect such revenue 




economic changes. No matter what level of government they are applied to, TELs are 
often considered as a necessary means to protect the general public from higher levels of 
taxes and government expenditures than what the public actually prefers. Moreover, 
TELs are in accord with modern democratic practice and self-government, given that 
they function to promote political accountability on the part of public officials—a 
condition especially important at the local level. As noted earlier, to date 42 states have 
implemented certain forms of fiscal limitations on municipal expenditures and/or 
revenues, predominantly property taxes. When these fiscal institutions are imposed by a 
higher level of government on a lower level of government, the implication of the policy 
becomes complex. One of the most critical concerns is that this type of TELs may hinder 
local political autonomy in terms of taxing authorities. Local governments are considered 
the most efficient providers of certain public services. Supporters of localism claim that 
since local governments are closer to the citizens they can better reflect citizen desires 
and encourage them to participate in public affairs, thus, promoting democratic values 
and practices (Brunori, 2003; Frug, 1980). Hence, in the era of tax and expenditure 
limitations, one area of local pubic finance that deserves considerable attention is how 
municipal governments restore local autonomy as well as promote political accountability 
through user charges.  
User charge financing is different from general tax financing in that user charge 
financing restores a direct relationship between the service received and tax payment, 
while under general tax financing the consumption-payment link is less clear or indirect 
at best. Due to the nature of a consumption-payment link with the user charge financing, 




provide cost signals that enable consumers to properly evaluate the service thereby 
discouraging excessive or wasteful consumption of the service. Based on this line of 
reasoning, scholars have proposed that a greater degree of reliance on user charge 
financing should lead to a more efficient service provision than tax financing method 
(Bailey, 1994a; Wagner, 1976).  
There are, however, issues of regressive levies and fairness associated with user 
charges. On one hand, based on the “benefit-received” principle or the notion of 
“horizontal equity,” user charges might be considered equitable and in the public’s best 
interest in that the recipients of identifiable benefits from a public service are held 
responsible for the support of that service. On the other hand, based on the “ability-to-
pay” principle or the notion of “vertical equity,” user charges may disadvantage lower-
income people, who tend to be net gainers under a traditional tax-financed system. By 
linking payments directly to benefits, however, user charges would take away some of 
the benefits the lower-income people would otherwise have enjoyed in the tax-financed 
system and would even make some goods or services unaffordable to these people. In 
addition, shifting to user charge financing for services can make local revenue systems 
more regressive—namely, low-income households may pay a greater proportion of their 
income for user charges than do higher income households, especially if everybody is 
subject to flat fees that ignore ability to pay. Thus, balancing out the demands of efficient 
use of public resources with concerns over social justice and fairness remains an ongoing 
concern.  
Finally, from the perspective of public management, under a charge-financed 




satisfy their needs, rather than “clients” who depend on their vendors for protection or 
patronage. Accordingly, public managers are expected to become directly responsive to 
the needs of the citizen in the manner of managers of private firms serving private 
consumers. The customer-service orientation of user charge financing is consistent with 
the central theme of the New Public Management movement that aims to improve 
efficiency and responsiveness in the public sector (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2003; 
Kaboolian, 1998). 
 
1.4 Aims and Organization of the Dissertation 
Despite the growing importance of user charges in municipal finance, there is, at 
this time, a lack of academic literature on the topic of user charges in general. 
Discussions of user charges that do exist have typically concentrated on the advantages, 
drawbacks and the types of services feasible for user charge financing (Bailey, 1994a; 
Bierhanzl & Downing, 1998; ACIR, 1987), formulas and costs function used in charging 
fees (Hirsch, 1965; Johnson, 1969), and revenue potential of user charges (Downing, 
1992). To date very few studies have discussed the causes and consequences of user 
charge financing for local public services.  
This dissertation provides one of the first integrated efforts to examine the causes 
and effects of municipal user charges. Following this introductory chapter which 
overviews the fiscal trends in American municipalities and the saliency of user charges in 
the field of public finance, Chapter 2 examines whether state-imposed TELs affect 
municipal reliance on user charges. The units of analysis are 724 American 




analysis includes city-fixed effects to control for unobserved factors that vary across 
cities but remain constant over time. It also employs a two-stage lease squares (2SLS) 
model to address potential endogeneity problem of the TELs. Regression results reveal 
that the implementation of TELs leads to a substantial increase in per capita user charges. 
Model specifications that neglect the endogeneity of TELs could lead to serious 
underestimates of the impact of this policy. The positive effect of TELs on municipal 
revenues may be an unintended consequence for many states. The results also suggest 
that the effects of TELs vary depending on the restrictiveness of the policy, the total 
number of limitations, and different types of TELs imposed on the municipality. 
Chapter 3 investigates whether the employment of user charges to finance certain 
local public services affects municipal expenditure levels for delivering these services. In 
particular, the analysis chooses sewer service and parks and recreation service as the 
focuses of the study for comparative reasons. Sewer services are heavily dependent on 
user charge financing while the use of user charges in parks and recreation services are 
moderate. Using two national samples based on the one developed in Chapter 2, the 
analysis suggests that a greater degree of user charge reliance of the charge-financed 
services results in a lower level of the expenditure for the services. 
Based on the findings presented in Chapters 2 and 3, the dissertation concludes 
with a discussion of policy implications in Chapter 4. As one of the first integrated efforts 
to examine the causes and effects of municipal user charges, this study contributes to our 
current understanding of the user charge financing instrument. Furthermore, since most 
previous studies have focused on individual municipalities within a single state, or are 




collected by all the municipalities within the county), this study may provide additional 
insights into the research topic by examining disaggregated data (i.e., data for each 
individual municipality) for a large number of national sample cities over an extended 
time period. Finally, this study is also vital to policy discussions of citizen participation in 
the policymaking process, political accountability and local autonomy, and efficiency 





















Figure 1.1 Municipal Own-Source Revenues by Source 
 
1972 2002 
Source: Author’s calculations from U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Survey of State and Local 

















Chapter 2: User Charges and Tax and Expenditure Limitations 
2.1 Introduction 
With the significant social, political and economic changes taking place in the 
United States over the past four decades, property taxes are no longer considered the 
most reliable revenue source for many American municipal governments. In their place 
user charges have become increasingly preferable by many local officials. As shown in 
Figure 2.1, the share of user charges in municipal own-source revenue increased by 9 
percentage points from 33% to 42% between 1972 and 2002 while the share of property 
taxes decreased by 14 percentage points from 37% to 23% during the same time period. 
Figure 2.1 also reveals a moderate increase in local sales taxes and miscellaneous general 
revenues. This implies that many American municipalities have been attempting to utilize 
more user charges, sales taxes and miscellaneous general revenues to compensate for the 
loss of property taxes.  
The upward trend of user charges and the downward trend of property taxes can 
be traced back to the early 1970s. However, it was not until the late 1970s and early 
1980s that dramatic changes occurred in both revenue sources. One striking event 
happened during that time was the massive enactment of tax and expenditure limitations.  
While tax and expenditure limitations on local governments can be traced back to the late 
19th century, the most significant development of the limitations took place in the 
aftermath of California’s Proposition 13 (in 1978) and Massachusetts’ Proposition 2 ½ (in 
1980). The change in user charge reliance and the trend of TELs raise the question of 




Specifically, do state-imposed TELs affect municipal reliance on user charges? Do 
different mechanisms or designs of TELs such as restrictions on tax rates, assessment, or 
total levy matter? Do the effects of TELs vary among local jurisdictions under different 
social-economic conditions?  
Previous studies identifying the causes of user charge reliance have been sparse. 
As one of the few such efforts, Netzer’s (1992) study found that differences in the mix of 
local expenditure, increased user charge financing for specific functions, personal 
income, and the ability to export business taxes were the main determinants of 
government reliance on user charges by local governments. Nevertheless, his study did 
neither examine the possible impacts of TELs nor the effects of federal fiscal devolution. 
In addition, the focus of his study was primarily on aggregated state and local revenues 
rather than revenues from individual municipalities. On the other hand, previous studies 
on the effect of TELs in general have found that TELs lead to increased use of state aid 
and increased reliance on the aggregate of user charges and miscellaneous revenue 
sources as opposed to local broad-based taxes (Hoene, 2004; Johnston, Pagano, & Russo, 
2000; Shadbegian, 1999). However, none of these studies specifically examined the 
effect of TELs on user charges. In addition, these studies either focused on municipalities 
within a single state or were limited to the aggregated or disaggregated county level data 
in a national sample. That is, no analysis has yet been undertaken to directly assess the 
link between TELs and municipal user charges using a national sample for an extended 
time period.   
This study attempts to fill in the research gap in studying causes of increased user 




25,000 in 1970 during the period of 1970 to 2004. It investigates the impact of state-
imposed TELs on municipal user charge reliance in the United States. Given that user 
charges are particularly important in financing sewerage, hospitals, solid waste 
management, utilities, and other essential services that municipal governments typically 
provide, a better understanding of the causes of user charge reliance is essential.  
Regression results indicate that the adoption of TELs leads to an increase in per 
capita user charges in municipalities. This effect becomes more substantial when the 
endogoneity of TELs is taken into consideration using the passage rate of citizen 
initiatives along with other social-economic variables as the instruments in a 2SLS 
model. The substantial increase in user charges is accompanied by the increases in sales 
taxes, license taxes, miscellaneous general revenue and total municipal expenditures. 
This suggests that the TEL policy may have caused unintended consequences and lead to 
a bigger government. Possible explanation includes that fiscal devolution may have 
resulted in the shift of responsibilities towards local governments. Increased expenditures 
(or responsibilities) require more local revenues. Since most TELs only restrict property 
taxes, other sources of revenues have been increasingly utilized by municipalities.  
In addition, the stronger effects of 2SLS estimation imply that some unobserved 
factors that vary across municipalities and change over time may decrease per capita user 
charges. These factors could include citizen resistance against user charges, legal 
obstacles, and fiscal capacities of implementing user charges, and so forth. 
Furthermore, a more detailed examination finds that the restrictiveness and the 




areas produces varying effects with some limitations having greater overall effects than 
do others.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section provides a 
brief review of previous studies on TELs. Section 2.3 explains the data and methodology 
employed in this study and section 2.4 presents empirical research findings. The chapter 
concludes in section 2.5 with a discussion of the regression results and suggestions for 
future research.  
 
2.2 Literature Review 
2.2.1 Theoretical Arguments  
A. The Leviathan Model of TELs 
 
 Many studies on TELs have implicitly or explicitly assumed a Leviathan model of 
government (Abrams & Dougan, 1986; Bails, 1982; Cutler, Elmendorf, & Zeckhauser, 
1999; Howard, 1989; Joyce & Mullins, 1991; Nelson, 1986). The central hypothesis of 
the Leviathan model is that it is only by imposing constitutional constraints on both 
government expenditure levels and sources of revenue that it becomes possible to curb 
the seemingly insatiable appetite of government officials for public spending, thereby 
limiting the growth of the public sector (Mueller, 2003, p. 382). Governments under the 
Leviathan model act as monopolies, with bureaucrats spending some proportion of total 
government revenues on specified public goods and services that benefit taxpayers. That 
is,   





G is public goods and services provided by the government; 
 R is total government revenues; and 
 α is the proportion of the revenue used for taxpayers, and 0 < α <1. 
The residual revenue R-G, referred to as the surplus, S, is available for the discretionary 
use of the government officials, which can be expressed as: 
S = R – G, or                                                                                                      (2.2) 
S = (1- α) R.                                                                                                       (2.3) 
Leviathan government, however, always aims to maximize the surplus for the 
benefit of the government officials. Since the more the total revenue collected, the larger 
the amount of surplus that goes to benefit government officials, the maximization of 
surplus becomes a matter of maximizing total revenue. Total revenue is subject to the tax 
base, b, tax rate, r, and competitive environment, c. Thus the task of the Leviathan 
government can be described as to maximize: 
R = R (b, r, c).                                                                                                   (2.4) 
By applying the Leviathan model, Brennan and Buchanan (1980) interpreted 
TELs and other fiscal rules in terms of social contract theory. Since political competition 
(e.g., party competition and interest group competition) is viewed as being ineffective on 
constraining the expansion of government due to the rational ignorance of voters, the 
uncertainties inherent in majority rule cycling and outright collusion among elected 
officials, citizens often demand constitutional arrangements to limit government 
revenues. Hence, if citizens were given a choice in the matter, particularly in the initial 
establishment of the government, citizens would choose certain constitutional limits on 




and Buchanan, amount to a social contact of the Rawlsian type (Brennan & Buchanan, 
1980, pp. 3-4; Rawls, 1971). In theory, once such constitutional limits on government 
action have been put in place, citizens recede into the background allowing politicians 
and bureaucrats to maximize government revenues within such constrains. Hence, it can 
be argued that if citizens had a say in the initial establishment of government, TELs 
would form an important limitation on government taxing and spending powers.  
Today TELs have three primary functions. First, TELs can restrict the tax rate that 
governments are allowed to impose—such as setting a limit on specific property tax rates. 
Second, TELs can constrain the tax base—such as imposing a limit on the assessment of 
property value. Finally, TELs can confine the total amount of tax levies or government 
expenditures. A Leviathan government has to operate under such limits and choose a 
combination of various tax bases and different rate structures that can best strengthen 
their competitiveness with other jurisdictions, ultimately helping the government in 
question achieve the goal of maximum revenue (and hence maximum spending).  
According to the Leviathan model, government’s capacity to tax citizens is 
weaker under a narrowly-defined tax base than under a broader one. On can thus assume 
that citizens would prefer to restrict government revenue sources that have broad tax 
bases, such as income taxes and property taxes, while remaining open to those sources 
that have narrow tax bases, such as sales taxes and user charges. The Leviathan model 
further indicates that from a government’s perspective, in order to maximize revenues 
within a fixed amount and to minimize the degree of distortion of economic behavior at 
the same time, an optimal tax should be the one that has the most inelastic source of 




Kahn (1952) has observed, as income grows income-elastic tax bases will also grow but 
at a higher speed than does income, therefore more income-elastic tax bases will have 
more growth potential over time. The Leviathan model predicts that citizens who want 
control over their government will be willing to impose constrains on those taxes with 
inelastic tax bases and limit government revenues to taxes that have more elastic tax 
bases. In addition, to prevent the government from granting interest groups special tax 
concessions, citizens, when initiating TELs, may require that the government impose tax 
schedules that are uniform across the jurisdiction. It is this aspect of TELs that provides 
the prospect of promoting political accountability, horizontal equity and, thus, limiting 
the government’s monolithic role in a society.  
 
B. The Rent-Seeking Model of TELs 
 An alternative view of TELs is based on a rent-seeking model and is best 
illustrated by Poulson and Kaplan (1994). As indicated, the rent seeking approach 
borrows the ideas from the interest group theory of politics and assumes that self-
interested politicians will attempt to minimize the political costs associated with 
expanding a given budget or revenue source (Hettich & Winer, 1984). Political costs 
arise from political conflict between taxpayers who oppose taxes and special interest 
groups who look to government for privileges or favorable policy outcomes, such as tax 
loopholes, that benefit their groups. Politicians can minimize these costs by shifting the 
tax burden to the party that is less sensitive. In the public choice literature privilege 
seeking by special interest groups is referred to as “rent seeking.” Rents are defined as 




the rights or entitlements to such returns through political actions. This type of activity 
was first discussed systematically by Tullock (1967) but it was Krueger (1974) that first 
used the term “rent seeking” to describe the activity in question. 
  Poulson and Kaplan’s (1994) seminal work was one of the few efforts of 
applying the rent-seeking model to the context of TELs. Instead of viewing TELs as an 
exogenous event as discussed in the Leviathan model, Poulson and Kaplan treated TELs 
as a result of complex decision making process in which the taxpayers, the rent-seeking 
interest groups, and politicians interact with each other to make fiscal choices. The design 
and implementation of TELs depend on how politicians respond to the efforts of the 
taxpayers to protect themselves from rent-seeking special interests, and to the efforts of 
these rent-seeking groups to pursue or defend their rent rights.  
 One possibility is that politicians support taxpayers’ demands by constraining tax 
revenues and government expenditures at the expense of the special interests. It is 
possible that some politicians truly identify with taxpayers’ ideology and are motivated 
by such beliefs to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of government; likewise, 
politicians may be animated by a sense of altruism in the pursuit of the general interest or 
public good. However, politicians may also act purely out of self-interest, appearing, 
ostensibly, to be satisfying the general interest but, in fact, simply pursue their own self-
interest, in order to remain in office and enhance their wealth and prestige.  
 Another possibility is that politicians respond to the request of the rent-seeking 
groups and co-design TELs that actually benefits special interests. These preemptive 
TELs make politicians appear to be fiscally prudent thus precluding taxpayers from 




giving some benefits to the special interests, these types of TELs also reduce the 
incentives for further rent-seeking from the special interest groups. Using this strategy, 
politicians can reduce the pressure from both sides of the political battles and, ultimately, 
maximize their own self-interest. However, the impact of these preemptive TELs on rent-
seeking interest groups is rarely uniform. Politicians may design TELs that benefit some 
interest groups at the expense of other interest groups in one area, and reverse this 
preference in another area (Spindler, 1990). This explains the various compositions of 
government revenues and expenditures. For instance, a TEL may be imposed on a subset 
of government spending, but exempt the earmarked portion from the limit. Another 
example is that a TEL may limit the growth of residential property levy but leave the 
commercial property levy unconstrained. The dynamics of this rent-seeking process 
makes the fiscal outcome uncertain. If the taxpayers dominate in the process, one could 
expect that the politicians would adopt the TELs that contain stricter budget constraints 
and effectively limit rent-seeking activity. On the other hand, if special interest groups 
control the process, one could expect a weak and ineffective TEL that grants 
opportunities for rent-seeking (Poulson & Kaplan, 1994). 
From what has been discussed, the Leviathan model is probably more appropriate 
for describing the constitutional TELs originated through citizen initiatives and referenda, 
while the rent-seeking model is more applicable for statutory constraints introduced by 
politicians. The Leviathan model basically ignores how TELs are created by the 
citizens—it simply assumes that citizens are averse to monolithic government and the 
costs of such a government. TELs may be approved unanimously, by a simple majority 




model does not explicitly discuss these possibilities. Rather, most of its attention has been 
given as to how politicians react to the established TELs, that is, how politicians 
maximize the revenue and budget within limits created by TELs. The Leviathan model 
treats the passage and implementation of TELs as a linear movement in which TELs and 
revenue maximization are two consecutive events, one following the other. In contrast, 
the rent-seeking model focuses on the complex process of decision making involving 
citizens, special interest groups and politicians. Politicians do not simply take a passive 
position as described in the Leviathan model, but play a rather active role in the design 
and implementation of the TELs. The rent-seeking model assumes that politicians 
maximize their self-interest but does not differentiate whether this maximization is 
realized trough revenue-maximization, vote-maximization, or both.  
One crucial problem associated with both models is that they treat government as 
a unified unit. These models may be adequate in explaining “state-level TELs” passed by 
the state government and imposed on the state government itself, or “locally-imposed 
TELs” that are adopted by and imposed on the local government itself. But these models 
remain open to questions concerning the application of “state-imposed TELs” passed by 
the state government and imposed on local governments. State and local governments are 
certainly not one unified unit. Even though local governments are creatures of the states,  
local governments are often on the defensive against state actions that impinge upon their 
autonomy (Anders & Shook, 2003). The National League of Cities (2006) also noticed a 
decline in intergovernmental partnerships and announced an emerging crisis of fiscal 
federalism. One solution to this problem associated with two models is to treat local 




bargaining process of the TELs along with other interest groups and taxpayers. 
Nevertheless, no matter which theoretical model one believes best describes the 
enactment of TELs, the fiscal impact of TELs should not be altered by the theory in any 
significant way. 
 
2.2.2 Empirical Analysis  
Considerable attention has been devoted in the literature to the topic of state-
imposed TELs. ACIR (1986) classified seven types of state-imposed TELs according to 
their content, including (1) “overall property tax rate limits” which apply to the aggregate 
tax rate of all local governments; (2) “specific property tax rate limits” which apply to 
specific types of local jurisdictions or narrowly-defined service areas; (3) “property tax 
levy limits” which confine the maximum amount of property tax revenue or annual 
percentage increase in the levy; (4) “limits on assessment increases” (or assessment 
increase limits) which restrict the growth rates in the assessment of property values; (5) 
“general revenue limits” which apply to all local tax proceeds and may apply to state aid 
as well; (6) “general expenditure limits” which apply to all local government 
expenditures except debt service, state and federal mandates, emergency expenditures, 
and so forth; and (7) “full disclosure” (or truth-in-taxation) which requires advertisement 
or announcement of new tax proposals and the involvement of public hearings and 
discussions on proposed tax increases.  
In theory, these limits vary in the extent to which they restrict local government 
taxing and spending levels although none of them is absolutely restrictive in practice. 




into two broad categories according to their potential effects on government fiscal 
outcomes: potentially binding TELs and non-binding TELs. Potentially binding TELs 
include (1) overall property tax rate coupled with assessment increase limits, (2) specific 
property tax rate coupled with assessment increase limits, (3) property tax levy limits, (4) 
general revenue limits, and (5) general expenditure limits. Non-binding TELs include (1) 
overall property tax rate limits, (2) specific property tax rate limits, (3) assessment 
increase limits, and (4) full disclosure. The latter category of TELs is considered less 
restrictive than the former type in that governments, if attempting to raise property tax 
revenues, could circumvent the rate limitations by increasing assessment values of the 
properties and vice versa. This two-category classification, as Joyce and Mullins 
explained, implies not only a physical ceiling but also public sentiment towards local 
taxing and spending. 
TELs may be adopted by different methods. These methods include citizen 
initiatives, referenda, legislative action, or constitutional conventions. Moreover, they can 
be suspended or overridden by simple or super majority votes of legislature, popular 
referenda, state board approval or court appeal while the limits prescribed may be 
statutory or constitutional. Most of the limits are designed to offset the growth in 
inflation, population, personal income, tax base, or can be established at a fixed 
percentage or dollar amount. Debt services, capital improvement and pension liabilities 
are usually exempted from TELs. The ACIR’s (1995) report Tax and Expenditure Limits 





Previous studies on TELs primarily focused on three areas: reasons for voter 
support, descriptive summaries, and estimated fiscal impact of TELs. For example, based 
on a statewide survey of Massachusetts residents in 1980, Ladd and Wilson (1982) 
suggested that TELs reflect voters’ desire for less taxes, quality service, and improved 
efficiency in government, rather than reduction in the public sector. Stein, Hamm, and 
Freeman (1983), by examining the petition signing of 1,459 citizens in Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin in 1978, found that voters support TELs out of their own self-interest, that is, 
those whose tax burdens most likely to be affected tend to support these limitations. Also 
with a focus on Massachusetts, Cutler, Elmendorf, and Zeckhauser (1999) took a unique 
approach by evaluating agency loss theory, regret or mission accomplished theory, 
personal finance theory, and demographic differences theory, and revealed two reasons 
for the Massachusetts Proposition 2 ½ 's support: people perceived agency losses from 
the difficulty of monitoring government, and people judged government to be inefficient 
because their tax burden was too high. Besides single state case studies, Alm and 
Skidmore (1999) used aggregated state-level data in all states over the period of 1978 to 
1990 and found that the passage of TELs was more related to economic growth, increases 
in property taxes or local revenues relative to state revenues than to demographic or 
political features of the state.  
Descriptive summaries indicated that 46 states have currently imposed some 
forms of TELs on local governments but that these TELs are not evenly distributed across 
regions—they are most prevalent in Western states and least employed in the Northeast 
region (Mullins & Wallin, 2004). Scholars also documented the implementation of the 




Wallin, 2004; Raimondo, 1983). A number of descriptive studies compared the average 
revenues and expenditures in states that have TELs with the averages of all states 
nationwide and described the changes in local fiscal structures from pre-TELs era to post-
TELs era (Hoene, 2004; Joyce & Mullins, 1991; Saxton, Hoene, & Erie, 2002). 
There is a substantial empirical literature examining the various effects of TELs 
on local public finance. However, only one study used disaggregated individual 
municipal data in a national sample. With respect to the impacts of TELs on local 
government size, previous studies produced mixed results largely due to different 
measures utilized to determine the actual size of government. Using public spending level 
as a measure of government size, some researchers concluded that TELs have little effect 
on the overall size of the local public sector (Galles & Sexton, 1998; Gold, 1979; Joyce & 
Mullins, 1991; Lowery, 1983; Mullins & Joyce, 1996). For instance, Saltzstein (1986) 
revealed that after Proposition 13, spending levels were not reduced among 25 large 
California cities in the early 1980s—only spending priorities had changed. However, 
using employment as a measure of government size, Poterba and Rueben’s (1995) study 
suggested some evidence that TELs might have in effect reduced government size. Based 
on individual-level data on wages and worker characteristics in the periods covering 
1979-1980 and 1990-1991 and percentage change in per capita local government 
employment between 1980 and 1991, Poterba and Rueben found that TELs slowed down 
local government employment growth for both men and women and depressed the wages 
paid to local government employees. Alternatively, the studies by Preston and Ichniowski 
(1991) and Shadbegian (1998) used government revenue as an indicator of government 




controlled for the effects of income and population. As the only analysis to date that has 
focused on individual municipalities nationwide, Preston and Ichniowski developed a 
panel of 1,368 municipalities over a ten-year period (1977-1986). They found that 
property tax rate limit, when coupled with assessment limits, can reduce the growth of 
property taxes and municipal own-source revenue per capita by 45% and 13%, 
respectively. Shadbegian (1998), using a dataset on local government budgets aggregated 
to the state level for the period of 1972 to1992, found similar evidence as in Preston and 
Ichniowski’s study and showed a reduction of 6% in the level of own-source revenue per 
capita, 8% in own expenditures per capita, and 3% in property taxes per capita. 
Previous studies generally suggested that TELs facilitated the changes in local 
revenue compositions, resulting in decreased use of taxes, shifts toward non-tax general 
revenues, as well as expanded relative fiscal role for state governments (Johnston et al., 
2000; Mullins & Joyce, 1996; Shadbegian, 1999; Sokolow, 2000). However, none of the 
existing studies specifically examined the impact of TELs on user charges levied by 
municipal governments. These studies simply treated user charges as one of the non-tax 
revenue sources (along with miscellaneous general revenue) and examined the overall 
impact of TELs on aggregate non-tax revenues. Furthermore, existing studies do not 
differentiate user charges collected by municipal governments from those collected by 
other types of local governments such as counties, special districts, or school districts.  
Among those studies that focused on county revenues or combined local 
government revenues, Shadbegian’s (1999) work stands out in that it treats TELs as 
endogenous rather than as in other studies. Using data on 2,955 U.S. counties from six 




all local government budgets, including municipal governments, to the county level, 
Shadbegian found that for each $1 reduction in taxes per capita there is a corresponding 
$0.27 increase in non-tax general revenue (including user charges and miscellaneous 
revenues) per capita. By taking into consideration the stringency of TEL laws (i.e., a state 
is considered having more stringent TELs when local property taxes are restricted to fiver 
percent growth or less, and less stringent otherwise), however, he found that this 
substitution effect (though less than dollar-for-dollar) only occurs in local governments 
facing less stringent TEL laws and not in those facing more stringent TEL laws. That is, 
local governments facing more stringent TEL laws suffer reductions in tax revenues but 
do not raise any additional non-tax general revenue to offset such loss. Therefore more 
stringent TELs reduce more own-source revenue than do less stringent TELs. 
Shadbegian, however, did not offer explanations about this interesting result. 
Using data from comprehensive annual financial report surveys (CAFRs) for 
either 1997 or 1998, Johnston, Pagano and Russo (2000) examined 107 counties within 
44 states and found that state-imposed revenue constraints—TEL restrictiveness 
combined with general taxing authority—mitigate county tax reliance and related resident 
tax burdens but also lead to increased reliance on user fees and charges (county-levied) 
and higher fee burdens for county residents. Their analysis suggested that states provide 
more financial assistance to those counties most constrained by restrictive TELs. 
Furthermore, using pooled cross-sectional time-series techniques and local government 
finance data aggregated at the state-level, Mullins and Joyce (1996) reached a similar 
conclusion on decreased use of local taxes and increased use of state aid and other non-




percentage of local general revenue. They also found that potentially binding TELs 
initially reduce local reliance on non-tax revenues but the effect becomes positive over 
time. One explanation offered by Mullins and Joyce was that higher charges and 
miscellaneous revenue collections were offset by the increased state aid followed 
immediately after the enactment of potentially binding TELs. Although these studies 
might serve as a good reference for studies on municipal revenue structures, they do not 
directly answer the question of how municipalities respond to the TELs. 
Other studies have focused on the impact TELs have on the composition and 
structure of local government revenues and how this impact may vary across 
jurisdictions. For example, David Merriman (1986) conducted a study on 108 New Jersey 
municipalities from 1977 to 1980 and found that high tax capacity and low density 
municipalities experienced the most severe spending cuts as a result of TELs. Using data 
on 255 Colorado municipalities from 1975 to 1996, Brown (2000) also found that 
smaller-sized municipalities were more constrained by the TELs compared with larger 
municipalities.  
Controlling for a number of demographic, social-economic, and structural 
characteristics of the individual county areas, and for broader national trend and state-
specific effects on the dependent measures, Mullins (2004) provided one of the first 
analyses with regard to the effects of TELs on fiscal disparities of the local governments 
across the U.S. using a multi-state, cross-sectional time series dataset. Specifically, he 
investigated 31,804 units of local governments in 787 metropolitan counties within the 
contiguous 48 states at five-year intervals in the period between 1972 and 1997. 




in per capita general revenues and expenditures of general purpose local governments and 
school districts within each county area. His findings imply that the fiscal impact of TELs 
is not uniform across local jurisdictions, with increased variation greatest within counties 
comprising the urban core and those with relatively more disadvantaged populations. 
This result raises the concern that TELs may constrain the ability of local governments to 
serve less well-off populations. However, this study, as with most of other studies, does 
not address the impact of TELs specifically on municipal user charges. 
Finally, a relatively smaller number of scholars attempted to estimate the 
distributional effects of TELs, but research findings remain uncertain (De Tray & 
Fernandez, 1986; Downes, Dye, & McGuire, 1998; O'Sullivan, Sexton, & Sheffrin, 1994; 
Sexton, Sheffrin, & O'Sullivan, 1999; Waters, Holland, & Weber, 1997). Some estimated 
that TELs may have benefited lower income homeowners (De Tray & Fernandez, 1986; 
O'Sullivan et al., 1994), while others found that lower income communities experienced 
larger reductions in educational outcome from TELs and TELs may have actually 
benefited higher income taxpayers (Downes et al., 1998; Waters et al., 1997).  
In terms of the scope of the studies, as mentioned above, most previous studies 
focused on single states such as California, Massachusetts, Colorado, Oregon, New 
Jersey and Michigan (Brown, 1999, 2000; Courant, Gramlich, & Rubinfeld, 1980; Cutler 
et al., 1999; Figlio, 1998; Galles & Sexton, 1998; James & Wallis, 2004; Kim, 1992; 
Merriman, 1986; Thompson & Green, 2004; Waters et al., 1997). Cross-state studies on 
state-imposed TELs tended to use individual counties as units of analysis, or more often, 
use local government data that are either aggregated at the state-level or county-level for 




al., 2000; McCabe, 2000; Mullins, 2004; Mullins & Joyce, 1996; Shadbegian, 1999). 
With an exception of the study by Preston and Ichniowski (1991), no other longitudinal 
research on the effect of TELs has employed a national sample with individual 
municipalities as units of analysis. However, Preston and Ichniowski’s study only 
examined a short period of time that immediately followed the massive enactment of 
TELs, 1977 to 1986. The long-term impact of state-imposed TELs on user charge 
reliance in American municipal governments throughout the nation remains unsolved and 
is worth of further investigation. 
 
2.3 Data and Methods 
2.3.1 Data and Unit of Analysis 
This study analyzes the effects of TELs on user charge reliance for a panel of 724 
sample cities with populations of at least 25,000 in 1970 for the period of 1970 through 
2004. Since most states with potentially binding TELs enacted their TELs after 1980, the 
inclusion of data from 1970 to1980 increases the variation in the critical TEL variable.  
Data used in this study came from several sources. Financial data were collected 
from the Census Bureau’s Annual Survey of Local Government Finances and Census of 
Governments (1970-2004); social, demographic, and economic data were collected from 
Census Bureau’s County and City Data Book (1972, 1977, 1983, 1988, 1994 and 2000); 
institutional and geographic data were collected from the ICMA’s Municipal Form of 
Government Survey (1981, 1986, 1991, 1996 and 2001) and Municipal Year Book (1971, 




report Tax and Expenditure Limits on Local Governments, Mullin & Wallin’s (2004) 
article “Tax and Expenditure Limitations: Introduction and Overview” and other web 
sources. All monetary terms have been adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) with 2004 as the base year. 
The Census Bureau conducts a Census of Governments every five years in years 
ending in 2 and 7 and an annual survey for the intervening years. While the Census of 
Governments reports financial data for all units of governments, the annual surveys 
contain either strictly sample units or both the sample and nonsample units (in states with 
central collection arrangements). Thus the number of records available for each year 
varies. In addition, effective with fiscal year 2002, records with imputed data are no 
longer available to the public. Hence, the number of records in 2002 does not represent 
the actual number of government units.4 
There were 837 municipalities (including Washington, DC) with populations over 
25,000 identified by the 1972 Census of Governments (U.S. Census Bureau, 1972), 
among which, around 100 cities failed to report consistently in the County and City Data 
Books and a number of cities were not found in the ICMA’s datasets. Thus, I derive a 
sample of 724 cities that have fairly consistent financial, social-economic and 
institutional data available. The 724 sample cities represent approximately 86% of the 
actual number of municipalities with populations over 25,000 in 1970. Washington, DC 
is excluded because the focus of the study is on a state-implemented policy. Furthermore, 
some sample cities were missing in the Annual Survey of Local Government Finances 
and Census of Governments for at least one year during the study period. Therefore, the 
dataset is an unbalanced panel with 23,012 observations or 91% of the possible city-
                                                 




years. Table A.1 and A.2 in Appendix A provide detailed information on the number of 
sample cities for each year and for each state. Table A.1 indicates that more than 91% of 
the sample cities have consistent data from 1970 to 1997 but the number of sample cities 
drops sharply since 1998, a 30-55% loss of sample cities each year from 1998 to 2004 
due to missing financial data in the Census survey. 
Table 2.1 presents the distribution of 724 sample cities by region, population size, 
metro status and government structure for the years of 1972 and 2000. Given that the 
1972 Census of Governments identifies 171 (20%) cities with populations over 25,000 in 
the Northeast region, 266 (32%) in the Midwest, 210 (25%) in the South, and 190 (23%) 
in the West, the sample represents very closely the actual share of cities in each region. 
The table also clearly shows that the population size of cities is growing especially 
among cities with populations between 25,000 and 249,999; about 60% of the cities are 
central cities, almost twice the number of suburban cities; and over 90% of the sample 
cities have mayor-council or council-manager forms of governments.5 
Table 2.2 summarizes TELs and user charges by region in 1997, the most recent 
year before the sample size shows significant drops (similar comparison for 2004 is 
reported in Appendix A, Table A.3). The sample consists of 719 cities in 1997. 
Compared with the full sample of 724 cities (as shown in Table 2.1), each region and all 
50 states are well represented in the 1997 sample. As of 1997, only eight states have no 
active TELs on municipal governments including Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, 
                                                 
5 Under the mayor-council form of government, both mayor and the council are elected; the council is the 
legislative body and the mayor is the chief executive who possesses budgetary, administrative, and 
appointive powers. Under the council-manager form of government, the elected council hires a city 
manager who carries out the policies set by the council. Under the commission form of government, the 
elected council performs both legislative and executive duties. Other forms of government include town 




Kansas, Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, and Wisconsin. There are 1,247 
municipalities (excluding Washington, DC) with populations over 25,000 identified by 
the 2002 Census of Governments (U.S. Census Bureau, 2002), among which, 94% have 
TELs. By region, 83% of the cities in the Northeast, 88% in the Midwest, 99% in the 
South, and 100% in the West are subject to TELs (see Appendix A, Table A.4). The 
widespread trend of TELs is well captured in the sample as shown in Table 2.2. The table 
clearly indicates that 92% of the sample cities are subject to TELs and almost all the 
cities (more than 99%) in the South and West regions have TELs. In addition, 542 or 
75% of the sample cities have potentially binding TELs including 174 cities with only 
potentially binding TELs and 368 cities with both potentially binding and non-binding 
TELs. On average, a municipal government collected approximately $91 million in user 
charges in 1997, which accounts for about 39% of municipal own-source revenue. Cities 
in the South demonstrate a greater degree of user charge reliance than their counterparts 
in other regions, collecting $875 in per capita user charges and generating about 49% of 
own-source revenue from user charges. 
Figures 2.2 through 2.4 illustrate the historical trends of the implementation of 
TELs in the United States. Specifically, Figure 2.2 indicates the number of cities subject 
to TELs (or “TEL cities”) and the number of limitations imposed on cities over the 
decades from 1970 to 1997; Figure 2.3 examines, in particular, the trend of potentially 
binding TELs; and Figure 2.4 disaggregates the trend into seven types of TELs and 
reveals the detail for each type of limitations. As shown, by 1970, 54% of the sample 
cities were subject to TELs but only 5% were subject to potentially binding TELs. The 




until the present. During the same time period, the percentage of cities that are 
constrained by potentially binding TELs increased to 55% in 1980 and continued to grow 
to 75% in 1997.  
In addition, over the past three decades an increasing number of municipalities 
have been subject to more than one type of TELs. As shown in Figure 2.2, in 1970, most 
of the TEL cities were only restricted by one type of limitations, while by 1997, a 
significant number of cities were restricted by four types of limitations and a few of them 
were even subjected to five types of TELs. Over the years, property tax levy limits have 
been the most popular type among the potentially binding TELs and general revenue 
limits the least used (see Figure 2.3). In fact, only three states have ever implemented 
general revenue limits—namely, Colorado (suspended in 2005), Minnesota (repealed in 
1993), and Nevada (repealed in 1989). As indicated in Figure 2.4, among all seven types 
of TELs, specific property tax rate limits have been the most prevalent.  
Figure 2.5 compares cities with TELs versus cities without TELs (or “non-TEL 
cities”) in 1997. In contrast to those without TELs, TEL cities, on average, rely more on 
user charges, sales taxes, income taxes, and “other” taxes, while relying less on property 
taxes. Interestingly, a comparison between cities with potentially binding or non-binding 
TELs, as shown in Figure 2.6, reveals a different pattern; namely, cities with potentially 
binding TELs rely more on property taxes and less on user charges than do their 
counterparts. This seems not only against our intuition but also to some extent contrary to 
previous studies that claimed potentially binding TELs resulted in increases in local 
reliance on non-tax revenues (Mullins & Joyce, 1996). It should be noted that here I 




“cities with potentially binding TELs” as those subject to potentially binding TELs 
including those may be also subject to non-binding TELs. It is also important to 
acknowledge that the size of the sample cities for each comparison varies substantially. 
Figure 2.5 compares the averages of 663 TEL cities with those of 56 non-TEL cities, 
while Figure 2.6 compares the averages of 542 cities with potentially binding TELs 
(including 174 cities with only potentially binding TELs and 368 cities with both 
potentially binding and non-binding TELs) with those of 121 cities with only non-binding 
TELs. On average, user charges in the 368 cities with both potentially binding and non-
binding TELs accounted for about 39% of municipal own-source revenue in 1997. 
In addition, simple t-tests (not reported here) on data from 1970 to 1997 show 
that, on average, cities with TELs collect more in per capita user charges and rely more 
on user charges as a percentage of own-source revenue than do cities without TELs, 
while cities with potentially binding TELs collect less in per capita user charges and rely 
less on user charges as a percentage of own-source revenue than do cities with non-
binding TELs. These results, however, do not explain how much impact TELs have on 
user charge reliance and whether different designs of TELs result in different fiscal 
outcomes. More importantly, the differences reported by t-tests do not control for various 
factors (other than TELs) that may affect user charge reliance. Regression analyses, 
therefore, are needed.       
 
2.3.2 Variables and Model 
To estimate the impact of TELs on user charge reliance in municipalities, this 




charges as a percentage of municipal own-source revenue. To differentiate the effects of 
TELs according to their potential restrictiveness on fiscal outcomes and their application 
(for example, on tax rates, tax levy, or assessment), this study also develops four 
measures for the TEL policy: (1) TELs, (2) potentially binding TELs and non-binding 
TELs, (3) specific types of TELs, and (4) total number of TELs. Thus, the analysis 
consists of two dependent variables and four sets of policy variables (i.e., key explanatory 
or independent variables). The definitions of variables are given in Table 2.3.  
I propose the following hypotheses: (1) the presence of a TEL leads to an increase 
in municipal reliance on user charges; (2) potentially binding TELs have a greater 
positive influence on user charge reliance than do non-binding TELs; (3) different types 
of TELs generate varying effects on municipal user charge reliance; and (4) the larger the 
number of limitations, the greater the increase on user charge reliance in municipalities. 
Considering that large cities may possess distinctive characteristics that 
distinguish them from small cities (e.g., racial composition, occupational segregation, 
income inequality, service structure and quality, and so forth), this study has created two 
subsamples drawn from the 724-city full sample: a large-city subsample on cities with 
populations over 250,000 in 2004 and a small-city subsample on cities with populations 
below 50,000 and above 25,000 in 2004. The large-city subsample consists of 65 cities 
(2,273 observations) and the small-city subsample contains 100 cities (3,220 
observations). Running regressions on three different sets of samples allows me to 




Thus, the impact of TELs on municipal user charge reliance is examined through 
eight regressions using different samples. The general equation for the regressions can be 
expressed as: 
itiitititit XFTELUC εδααα ++++= 321 ,                                                           (2.5) 
where: 
UCit is user charge reliance measured by user charges per capita or as a 
percentage of municipal own-source revenue for municipality i in year t; 
TELit is a dummy for municipality i in year t (1= municipality i in year t subject to 
TELs; 0 = municipality i in year t not subject to TELs); this variable is replaced by 
potentially binding TELs and non-binding TELs, specific types of TELs, and the number 
of TELs in other model specifications; 
Fit is a vector of fiscal variables for municipality i in year t, including taxes per 
capita or percentage (TAX), intergovernmental revenue per capita or percentage (IGR), 
debt per capita or percentage (DEBT), expenditure mix (EXPMIX), optional tax 
(OPTION), and special districts (DISTRICT);  
Xit is a vector of social-economic and institutional variables for municipality i in 
year t that reflect the characteristics of the municipalities including population (in log 
form), personal income (in log form) and form of government;  
iδ is a city-specific intercept; and  
itε is the error term. 
The inclusion of fiscal variables is intended to account for municipal expenditure 
and revenue policies. Specifically, total taxes per capita or as a percentage of municipal 




Municipalities showing greater taxing capacity are expected to rely less on user charges 
for revenues. Similarly, IGR allows for the possibility that municipal governments 
substitute federal and state monies for own-source revenue. Therefore it is expected to be 
negatively associated with user charge reliance. Debt per capita and debt percentage 
(debt-revenue ratio) reflect the long-term solvency of a municipal government. Many 
municipal governments issue bonds for transportation projects, and water, sewer, and gas 
facilities where user charges play a significant role as a financing tool. On the other hand, 
municipalities with higher level of debt may have fewer needs for user charges or greater 
capacity for collecting user charges.  
Expenditure mix controls for intercity variations in providing services that have 
traditionally depended heavily on user charges for financing. Based on the national 
average of percentage of expenditures covered by user charges for specific services (i.e., 
user charge revenue collected from a specific service divided by total expenditure for 
delivering such service) using aggregated data on total U.S. cities from 1972-2002, ten 
municipal functions are identified as “charge-heavy” service areas (for further 
information, see Chapter 3, Table 3.1). These areas include sewerage, hospitals, airports, 
solid waste management, parking, water transport, water supply, electricity supply, gas 
supply, and public transit. A higher percentage of expenditure mix indicates that cities 
devote a greater portion of total government expenditures to functions for which user 
charges play a significant role nationwide.  
The optional tax, a dummy variable where municipalities generate revenue from 
local sales and/or income taxes, represents municipal capacity in raising non-property tax 




2006, local governments, including counties and municipalities, in 33 states have access 
to local option sales taxes, among which, 22 states have authorized municipalities to 
collect local option sales taxes (Federation of Tax Administrators, 2006). In addition, a 
few states have granted municipalities the authority to levy local income taxes. 
Approximately 73% of the observations in the full sample contain revenues from local 
sales taxes, and 11% have revenues from local income taxes. 
Since certain charge-financed services, such as sewer service, parks and 
recreation service, as well as utilities, are provided through special districts rather than 
municipal governments in some regions, the number of special districts within the county 
where the municipality is located is also included.6  
Population (in log form) and per capita personal income (in log form) are 
included to account for differences in citizen’s preferences or demands for public goods 
and costs of providing such goods across jurisdictions. In addition, a dummy variable—
council-manager city—is included to capture possible impacts of governance structure. 
The literature suggests that professional city managers in a council-manager government 
are more likely to provide services efficiently than do their counterparts in other forms of 
municipal governments (Booms, 1966; Clark, 1968; Lineberry & Fowler, 1967; Stumm 
& Corrigan, 1998). It is expected that professionally managed council-manager cities 
tend to rely more on user charges for efficiency gains. 
                                                 
6 It would be ideal to identify the exact number of special districts serving the municipality. However, such 
data are unavailable and difficult to calculate due to the fact that many special districts serve areas across 
city or even county boundaries. Therefore, the number of special districts within a county area is used as a 




Table 2.4 reports the descriptive statistics for the full sample. For further 
information on descriptive statistics of the large-city and small-city subsamples, refer to 
Appendix A, Tables A.5-A.6. 
Given that city characteristics are unlikely a random assignment to cities, I 
employ city-fixed effects (FE) regression models for estimation. The FE model helps 
control for those unobserved factors that vary across cities but remain constant over time 
such as unique political cultures and historical circumstances for each municipality, 
thereby ensuring that the effects of TELs are identified using only within-city variations 
over time. In addition, the FE estimates are adjusted with cluster-robust standard errors in 
an attempt to control for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation problems. Since all 
municipalities within a single state receive the same value for TELs in a given year, that 
is, the policy variable, TELs, has repeated values on municipalities within a state, the 
standard errors are clustered on the variable identifying each state (rather than each 
municipality) to account for intra-state clustering of errors over time and across 
municipalities within the state.  
 
2.3.3 Endogeneity of TELs 
Existing studies on TELs often assume that tax and expenditure limitations are 
exogenous events randomly assigned across states (Johnston et al., 2000; Mullins, 2004; 
Mullins & Joyce, 1996). However, a number of researchers raise questions about this 
assumption and warn that a possible endogeneity problem may exist and thus bias 
estimates of the effects of TELs (Poterba & Rueben, 1995; Rueben, 1996; Shadbegian, 




affect both the enactment of TELs and fiscal policy outcomes. The passage of TELs may 
simply reflect voters’ preferences for a lower level of expenditure and/or revenue or 
different financing mechanisms. Thus, a positive or negative correlation between TELs 
and user charge reliance may not indicate a causal relationship per se. If citizens want to 
shift the municipal revenue structure from a traditional tax-based structure towards a user 
charge-based structure by voting for a TEL that restricts the use of taxes, then a positive 
correlation between TELs and user charge reliance could be found. On the other hand, if 
citizens in a state with less use of user charges and more use of taxes are more likely to 
vote for a TEL, then a negative correlation between TELs and user charge reliance could 
be found. However, in neither case does a causal relationship exit. 
To solve the endogeneity problem of TELs, we need to exploit instrumental 
variables that generate plausibly exogenous variation in the incidence of TELs. A valid 
instrumental variable (“instrument”) must meet two requirements: first, the instrument 
must be relevant, that is, the variation in the instrument is related to variation in the 
endogenous regressor; second, the instrument must be exogenous, that is, the variation in 
the instrument is not related to the error disturbance (Stock & Watson, 2003). Applied to 
this study, the instruments must be directly related to the possibility of a state passing a 
TEL (i.e., “instrument relevance”) but not directly related to other unobserved factors 
affecting the degree of user charge reliance (i.e., “instrument exogeneity”). In other 
words, instrumental variables must affect user charge reliance only indirectly through the 
passage of TELs.  
Rueben (1996) used direct legislation rules (i.e., provisions within a state’s 




as an instrument for the passage of a TEL and found that the estimated impact of state-
level TELs on state fiscal outcomes changed substantially compared with the estimates 
treating TELs exogenously. However, as Shadbegian (1999) argues, direct legislation 
rules are time invariant and thus Rueben’s model does not allow the use of FE estimators 
which are important in a panel data analysis of this topic. To alleviate this problem, 
Shadbegian proposed another instrument, the rate at which voters are able to pass citizen 
initiatives or referenda (on any subject matter), in the research. The underlying 
assumption is that the states where citizens are more successful in passing their initiatives 
or referenda are more likely to adopt TELs, no matter if they are originated through 
citizen initiatives, referenda or are introduced by state legislators. Higher passage rate 
may put heavier pressure on the legislators to introduce a TEL. Using this instrument in a 
FE model Shadbegian found that the negative impacts of TELs on local property taxes 
and non-tax revenue are smaller than when TELs are assumed exogenously. He also 
found that more stringent TELs (which restrict the growth of property taxes to five 
percent or less) reduce local own-source revenue by more than less stringent TELs but do 
not raise any additional non-tax revenue to offset the loss in taxes as do less stringent 
TELs. 
I consider Shadbegian’s approach is more appropriate, thereby adopting the 
passage rate of initiatives (PASS) as an instrument in the analysis. Data on passage rate 
of citizen initiatives from 1967 to 2004 were provided by the Initiative and Referendum 
Institute (IRI) at the University of Southern California (IRI, 2008). However, information 




Further examination of the independent variables raises the concern that taxes, 
IGR, and expenditure mix are also potentially endogenous since these fiscal aspects often 
depend on local socioeconomic conditions. I thus include eight more variables—the log 
form of land area (LAND), the log form of gross business receipts (RECEIPT), 
unemployment rate (UNEMP), the percentage of population that is non-white 
(NONWHITE), the percentage of population under the age of 18 (AGE18), the 
percentage of population over the age of 65 (AGE65), the percentage of owner-occupied 
housing units (HOUSE), and central city (CENTRAL)—as additional instruments along 
with the passage rate. The definitions of instrumental variables are given in Table 2.3. 
If all proposed instruments are valid, that is, they satisfy the conditions of 
instrument relevance and exogeneity, the coefficients on endogenous variables from 
Equation (2.5) can be estimated using a 2SLS model. The first stage begins with four 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions with city-fixed effects ( iθ ) that link each of 
the four endogenous variables (i.e., TEL, TAX, IGR, and EXPMIX) and the entire set of 























The second stage of 2SLS is to regress itUC  on itLET ˆ , itXAT ˆ , itRGI ˆ , and 
itMIXPEX ˆ , the predicted value obtained from the first-stage regressions, along with other 
exogenous variables in Equation (2.5). The city-fixed effects ( iλ ) are also included. The 
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(2.7) 
 The 2SLS approach is applied to model specifications using TELs and the number 
of TELs as the independent variables of primary interest, respectively. 
 
2.4 Research Findings 
2.4.1 TELs Treated Exogenously 
A. Effects of TELs 
Tables 2.5 through 2.7 report regression results of the effects of TELs on user 
charges per capita and user charges as a percentage of municipal own-source revenue, 
assuming that TELs are an exogenous event. Specifically, results in Table 2.5 are 
obtained from regressions on 724 sample cities; results in Table 2.6 are drawn from 65 
large cities; and results in Table 2.7 are based on 100 small cities. Each table includes the 
OLS with FE estimators. 
As expected, the results show that the presence of TELs is associated with an 
increase in user charges per capita in municipalities, measured by a $130 increase in 724 
sample cities, a $178 increase in large cities, and a $172 increase in small cities, all other 
things being equal. Since the average amount of user charges per capita among the 724 
sample cities is about $470 (see Table 2.4), the $130 increase would account for 28% of 
the sample average, which suggests that the magnitude of this effect is considerably 




annually than do cities without TELs, holding all other factors constant. This effect has a 
greater scale in both large cities and small cities where the increases account for 31% and 
34% of the sample average of per capita user charges, respectively (see Appendix A, 
Tables A.5 and A.6). On average, total per capita municipal expenditure is $1,514, 
$2,060 and $1,575 in the full sample, large cities, and small cities, respectively. 
Compared with per capita municipal expenditures, the increases in user charges account 
for about 9% in the full sample and large cities and 11% in small cities.  
When user charge reliance is measured as a percentage of municipal own-source 
revenue, however, the effect of TELs seems less certain. As indicated in column (2) in 
each of the three tables, the estimated coefficients on TELs fail to achieve statistical 
significance at any conventional level.  
Considering that the considerable loss of the sample size between 1998 and 2004 
may bias the regression results, I also run regressions using 724 sample cities for the 
period of 1970 to 1997. The results are reported in Appendix A, Table A.7. As shown, 
the results using the sample during 1970 and 1997 are consistent with the ones using the 
sample from 1970 to 2004. Thus, I conclude that the implementation of TELs leads to a 
substantial increase in user charges per capita but does not affect the share of user 
charges in municipal own-source revenue. 
 
 
B. Effects of Potentially Binding and Non-Binding TELs  
 A further analysis of the impact of TELs takes into consideration the stringency or 
restrictiveness of the TEL policy—potentially binding TELs and non-binding TELs. The 




between the two categories of TELs, I also include an interaction term, “both TELs,” 
indicating the simultaneous existence of both potentially binding and non-binding TELs. 
The first panel of the table shows coefficients for the full sample, the second panel for the 
large-city sample, and the third panel for the small-city sample. For brevity, Table 2.8 
presents only the estimated coefficients on potentially binding TELs and non-binding 
TELs.  
As displayed in Table 2.8, potentially binding TELs increase per capita user 
charges by $76 in the full sample (=156-80), by $114 in the large-city sample, and by $43 
(=168-125) in the small-city sample, holding all other factors constant. Non-binding 
TELs show a similar positive impact in both large-city and small-city samples, $149 and 
$30 (=156-126), respectively, but this effect fails to reach statistical significance at any 
conventional level in the full sample. Additional t-tests reveal that the effects of 
potentially binding and non-binding TELs on per capita user charges are statistically 
indistinguishable. Furthermore, when both categories of TELs coexist, that is, when a city 
is subject to both potentially binding and non-binding TELs, the changes in per capita 
user charges are negative in both full and small-city samples. This suggests that 
potentially binding and non-binding TELs counteract with each other in terms of their 
effects on user charge reliance in the full and small-city samples. 
 On the other hand, when using user charges as a percentage of municipal own-
source revenue as the dependent variable, only potentially binding TELs show a 
statistically significant impact on user charges. This impact is evident in the large and 
small cities but not in the full sample. Specifically, among cities with populations below 




binding TELs are 1.9 percentage points higher than cities without potentially binding 
TELs. Nonetheless, this positive impact among cities with populations above 250,000 is 
not sizable (an increase of 0.05 percentage points) and thus not practically meaningful.  
Overall, the above findings suggest that the restrictiveness of TELs matters in the 
full sample, in particular the middle-sized cities with populations above 50,000 and 
below 250,000, regarding to the dollar amount of per capita user charges and in small 
cities with populations below 50,000 in terms of the share of user charges in own-source 
revenue. However, the restrictiveness of TELs does not make a difference in the large 
and small cities regarding to per capita user charges since both categories of TELs could 
facilitate the increases in per capita user charges and the effects are not statistically 
discernable. There is also some evidence that the effects of potentially binding and non-
binding TELs may offset against each other depending on the population size of the 
cities. 
 
C. Effects of Specific Types of TELs 
The study also provides a detailed examination of each specific type of TELs 
using the full sample, large-city sample and small-city sample. Seven dummy variables 
indicate seven types of TELs with non-TEL cities serving as the reference category. 
Since overall property tax rate limits, assessment increase limits and general expenditure 
limits are highly correlated with each other as shown in Table 2.9, I create a new dummy 
variable indicating the presence of any of the three types. The new dummy variable along 
with other four dummy variables—specific property tax rate limits, property tax levy 




Tables 2.10 through 2.12 report regression results for the effects of specific types 
of TELs. To be concise, the estimated coefficients on control variables are not reported 
here. Columns (1) of the tables indicate that specific property tax rate limits and full 
disclosure have positive impacts on user charges per capita and the effects are consistent 
in all three samples. That is, specific property tax rate limits lead to an increase in per 
capita user charges by $88 in the full sample, by $61 in the large-city sample, and by 
$109 in the small-city sample, and full disclosure increases per capita user charges by 
$112 in the full sample, by $238 in the large-city sample, and by $119 in the small-city 
sample, holding all other factors constant. The results also show some evidence of 
positive effects of overall property tax rate limits, assessment increase limits, general 
expenditure limits, and property tax levy limits on user charges per capita but the effects 
vary depending on the population size of the cities. General revenue limits are the only 
type of TELs that has a negative impact on user charges per capita especially in the full 
and large-city samples.  
 When using user charges as a percentage of own-source revenue as the dependent 
variable, the results (columns 2) become complicated. None of the seven types of 
limitations demonstrates any statistically significant impacts on user charge reliance 
using the full sample. However, focusing on the large cities and small cities reveals that 
specific property tax rate limits, property tax levy limits, overall property tax rate limits, 
assessment increase limits and general expenditure limits may lead to moderate increases 




In short, these findings suggest that specific types of TELs produce varying 
effects on user charge reliance with specific property tax rate limits and full disclosure 
having the greater overall effects than do others.  
 
D. Effects of Total Number of TELs 
As indicated earlier, among cities with TELs, the number of limitations ranges 
from 1 to 5 based on the classification of seven types of TELs. Specifically, about 36% of 
the observations in the sample have one type of TELs, 33% have two types, 23% have 
three types, 8% have four types, and less than 1% of the observations have five types of 
TELs. Table 2.13 describes the variation in the number of TELs by state. Eleven states 
have experienced no changes in the number of limitations over the past 35 years. I expect 
that cities subject to a larger number of TELs rely more on user charges than do their 
counterparts. Table 2.14 presents the estimated coefficients on the number of TELs for 
the full sample using user charges per capita and user charges as a percentage of own-
source revenue as the dependent variable, respectively.  
Column (1) of the table indicates that, among cities with TELs, for each 
additional type of limitations, user charges per capita increase by $57, all other things 
being equal. This linear relationship between the number of TELs and per capita user 
charges is confirmed in that when adding a square term of the number of TELs into the 
model the square term fails to reach statistical significance and, thus, is dropped from the 
model specification. In contrast, an increase in the number of limitations seems to lead to 
a decrease in the share of user charges in total own-source revenue. However, this 




1.109/(0.269*2)=2.06). Simple calculations based upon the coefficients on the number of 
TELs and on its square term reveal that when the number of TELs increases from 0 to 1, 
user charges as a percentage of own-source revenue decreases by 0.8 percentage points; 
when the number increases from 1 to 2, user charge percentage decreases by 0.3 
percentage points; when the number increases from 2 to 3, user charge percentage 
increases by 0.2 percentage points; when the number increases from 3 to 4, user charge 
percentage increases by 0.8 percentage points, and when the number increases from 4 to 
5, user charge percentage increases by 1.3 percentage points, holding all other factors 
constant.  
Since cities with five types of limitations account for less than 1% of the sample 
observations, which reduces the practical meaning of their sizable statistical effect, I 
conclude that TELs have the most substantial effect on cities with none or three types of 
TELs if the state government imposes an additional limitation on municipal taxing and 
spending. Nevertheless, the directions of the effects are opposite to each other: a negative 
impact in cities with no existing type of TELs, and a positive impact in cities with three 
existing types of TELs. The magnitude of the effect, however, is minimal. 
 
2.4.2 TELs Treated Endogenously 
 Since endogeneity is one of the major concerns of this study, I also examine the 
effects of TELs using the 2SLS regressions that treat TELs endogenously and then 
compare the results with the ones obtained from previous OLS models treating TELs 
exogenously. Ideally one would like to conduct corresponding tests for all the four OLS 




instruments for potentially binding and non-binding TELs and for each specific types of 
TELs, I only apply the 2SLS approach to the investigation of the effects of the presence 
of TELs and the number of TELs. Both OLS and 2SLS models include city-fixed effects. 
 
 
A. Effects of TELs 
Tables 2.15 and 2.17 report the estimated effects of TELs on user charge reliance 
using the 2SLS approach with city-fixed effects, assuming that TELs are an endogenous 
event. Specifically, Table 2.15 presents the results of the 2SLS regressions using the full 
sample; Table 2.16 uses the large-city sample; and Table 2.17 uses the small-city sample. 
All three models treat TELs, taxes, IGR, and expenditure mix as endogenous regressors 
and employ a set of variables including passage rate, land area (in log form), business 
receipts (in log form), unemployment rate, non-white, age 18, age 65, owner-occupied 
housing, and central city as the instruments. 
 As indicated in Table 2.15, the first-stage F-statistics in both models exceed 10, 
which suggest that the instruments are not weak, that is, the instruments satisfy the 
relevance requirement discussed in Section 2.3.3. Furthermore, the overidentification 
tests show that the J-statistic is 4.508 with a p-value of 0.479 when using user charges per 
capita as the dependent variable, and 7.856 with 0.164 when using user charge percentage 
as the dependent variable. This implies that all the instruments are exogenous.  
 The 2SLS regression results using the full sample show that the implementation 
of TELs leads to approximately a $1,080 increase in per capita user charges and a 7.5 
percentage point increase in user charges as a percentage of own-source revenue, all 




estimates when TELs are treated exogenously (see Table 2.5). The OLS models estimate 
a $130 increase in per capita user charges and no statistically significant effect on user 
charge percentage in cities with TELs. Further, applying the Hausman test of 
endogeneity, I find that the null hypothesis that an OLS with FE approach would yield 
consistent estimates is rejected at the 1% significance level. This rejection indicates a 
possible endogeneity among the regressors that has caused the OLS with FE estimates 
inconsistent. Thus the instrumental variables FE estimator (i.e., 2SLS with FE) should be 
employed for estimation (Wooldridge, 2009).  
 Using the large-city sample and small-city sample, the 2SLS regressions produce 
similar results regarding to the effects of TELs on user charges per capita. As shown in 
Tables 2.16 and 2.17, the presence of TELs leads to a $574 increase in per capita user 
charges in large cities and a $1,088 increase in small cities. These effects are much larger 
compared with the estimates from the OLS models (see Tables 2.6 and 2.7). The 
predicted effect of TELs on user charge percentage is positive in both large and small 
cities, but fails to reach statistical significance in large cities and is significant only at the 
10% level. In addition, the first-stage F-statistics are below 10 in both samples. This 
suggests that the effects of TELs on user charge percentage are uncertain in the large 
cities and small cities.  
Alternative test using the 724 sample cities for the period of 1970 through 1997 
reveals a substantial increase in per capita user charges and no statistically significant 
impact on user charge percentage (see Appendix A, Table A.8). 
 In short, results from the 2SLS approach strongly suggest that the effect of TELs 




neglected. The estimate of the 2SLS using the full sample is about eight times the 
estimate of the OLS and accounts for about 71% of total per capita municipal 
expenditures ($1,514), which seems implausibly large. I have further experimented with a 
number of different model specifications using different sets of control variables and 
instruments. The results are somewhat sensitive in that the estimates on the TEL 
coefficients vary over a certain range. Nonetheless, the coefficients are always positive, 
larger than the OLS estimates, and statistically significant at the conventional level. 
Hence, it is safe to conclude that TELs do indeed lead to greater reliance on municipal 
user charges and some omitted variables bias downward the coefficients on the TEL 
policy obtained in the specifications treating TELs exogenously. These omitted variables 
may include unobserved factors that vary across municipalities and change over time 
such as citizen resistance against user charges, legal obstacles, and fiscal capacities of 
implementing user charges.  
Besides the policy variable, TELs, a brief discussion of the predicted effects of 
the control variables is also worthwhile. Although most of the control variables seem to 
affect user charge reliance in the OLS models that treat TELs exogenously, they fail to 
achieve statistical significance in the 2SLS models. Based on the results from Tables 
2.15, 2.16, 2.17 and A.8, municipal debt seems to increase user charges per capita and 
decrease user charge percentage, but these effects are not sizable in magnitude. 
Population shows negative impacts on user charge reliance, which suggests that 
municipalities may prefer to increase taxes or revenues other than user charges when 




tax, per capita personal income and council-manager form of government do not affect 
user charge reliance in municipalities.  
 
B. Effects of Total Number of TELs 
Table 2.18 summarizes the 2SLS regression results on the effects of total number 
of TELs. As indicated in column (1), for an additional type of TELs, cities collect $212 
more in per capita user charges, all others being equal. The Hausman endogeneity test 
indicates the presence of endogeneity and the first-stage F-statistic and overidentifying 
test suggest the validity of the instruments. This effect is about four times the effect 
estimated from the OLS model assuming TELs are exogenous (see Table 2.14). 
However, the effect of the number of TELs on user charge percentage is not statistically 
significant. In sum, this finding is consistent with the findings from the model 
specifications using TELs as the independent variable. Both model specifications clearly 
indicate a positive relationship between the TEL policy and the utilization of user charges 
in municipalities.  
 Further investigations of the effects of TELs find that TELs not only lead to the 
increases in user charges, but also to the increases in sales taxes, miscellaneous general 
revenues, and other taxes (rather than sales, income and property taxes). Only property 
taxes show reductions under the TEL policy. The overall increase in own-source 
revenues is accompanied by the increase in total expenditures. This result may be an 
unintended consequence of the TEL policy. In the era of fiscal devolution, municipal 




expenditures. Since most TELs target at property taxes, other sources of revenues may 
become more appealing to municipal administrators. 
 
2.5 Discussion and Suggestions for Future Research 
Since the late 1970s, user charges have emerged as one of the major revenue 
sources for municipal governments in the United States. A common perception is that this 
increased use of user charges is associated with the adoption of state-imposed tax and 
expenditure limitations on local governments. However, the existing literature on public 
budgeting and finance has produced little evidence that TELs have caused the increases 
in local use of user charges (i.e, general charges and utility revenue)—the research is 
especially weak in a municipality setting. This study provides the first rigorous empirical 
analysis of the linkage between TELs and the increased use of municipal user charges. 
By investigating a nationwide sample of 724 cities over the period of 1970 through 2004, 
this study addresses the question of whether the implementation of the TEL policy 
increases user charge reliance at the municipality level. It employs the fixed-effects 
estimation techniques for predicting the effects of TELs and adopts instrumental 
variables in the 2SLS models to alleviate the potential endogeneity of TELs.  
The proceeding analysis, in general, supports the four hypotheses proposed earlier 
but also reveals several important findings in regard to the effects of TELs. First, the 
analysis strongly suggests that the implementation of TELs leads to a greater amount of 
user charge revenue per capita; the influence of TELs on user charges is even more 
striking when taking into account the potential endogeneity of TELs. Using the passage 




economic variables as the instruments, the 2SLS fixed effects regression estimates that, 
on average, per capita user charges in cities with TELs are about $1,080 higher than those 
collected by cities without TELs. However, when user charge reliance is measured by a 
percentage of municipal own-source revenue instead, the fiscal outcome becomes less 
consistent. The OLS with fixed effects model suggests a negative impact of TELs on user 
charge percentage but fails to reach statistical significance. The 2SLS model produces a 
positive effect of TELs on user charge percentage in the full sample, but not in the large-
city and small-city samples (the positive impact in the small cities is not reliable because 
of the weak instruments). Since the endogeneity of TELs is likely to occur for the reasons 
discussed above, I consider the result of the 2SLS regression is more reliable.  
Second, the analysis on the restrictiveness of TELs yields mixed results. 
Potentially binding TELs lead to substantial increases in per capita user charges in all 
samples, while non-binding TELs only show positive impacts in large cities and small 
cities. The effects of the two categories of TELs in both large and small cities are not 
statistically distinguishable. This means that the restrictiveness of TELs matters in the 
middle-sized cities with populations between 50,000 and 250,000 but not in large cities 
with populations over 250,000 and small cities with populations below 50,000 regarding 
to the effects on user charges per capita. The results also indicate that potentially binding 
TELs increase the share of user charges by 1.9 percentage points in small cities but not in 
large cities and the full sample. This finding is different from Mullins and Joyce’s 
previous study which suggested that potentially binding TELs initially decrease the share 




addition, I find that these two categories of TELs may counteract with each other in 
influencing the degree of municipal user charge reliance.  
Third, detailed examination of each specific type of TELs reveals that specific 
types of TELs generate varying effects on user charge reliance with some limitations 
showing a positive effect while others a negative effect. In general, specific property tax 
rate limits and full disclosure appear to have greater overall effects than do others. 
Specific property tax rate limits increase user charge reliance by $88 per capita in the full 
sample, by $61 per capita in the large-city sample, and by $109 per capita in the small-
city sample. Full disclosure increases user charges per capita by $112, $238, and $119 in 
the full sample, large-city sample, and small-city sample, respectively. It should be 
pointed out that Joyce and Mullins’ previous studies excluded full disclosure from their 
analyses because of the “procedural rather than revenue or expenditure focus” of the 
limitation and because of its “relative non-constraining nature” (Joyce & Mullins, 1991; 
Mullins, 2004, p. 123; Mullins & Joyce, 1996). The present analysis, however, finds 
strong evidence that full disclosure has a substantial impact on user charge reliance in 
municipalities. On the other hand, general revenue limits decrease user charges per capita 
by $71 in the full sample and by $54 in the large-city sample. There is also evidence of 
increased share of user charges associated with some types of the limitations but the 
effects are not consistent across different samples.  
Finally, the proceeding analysis also shows that cities subject to more types of 
TELs raise more in the absolute amount of per capita user charges. These findings are 
consistent in both OLS and 2SLS models. The OLS models also find that cities subject to 




source revenue as the number of limitations increases, while cities subject to more than 
two types of TELs rely more on user charges as the number of limitations increases. 
These effects seem most influential in cities with none or three types of TELs. However, 
the 2SLS model does not find these effects on the share of user charges have any 
statistical significance. 
The conclusions made in this study are still tentative and several issues remain 
open to scrutiny. Above all, this study does not control for locally-imposed TELs in 
examining the effects of state-imposed TELs due to the lack of data. Locally-imposed 
TELs often constrains local ability in raising property taxes and/or sales taxes and thus 
may force local governments to rely more on user charges. This means that the 
coefficients on TELs reported here could be biased upward. Based on a survey of 320 
American cities, Brooks and Philips (2009) suggests that at least one in eight cities, 
especially large cities with populations over 100,000, has enacted a locally-imposed TEL. 
Further research should take into consideration the effect of locally-imposed TELs when 
data become available. 
In addition, this study does not take into account the factor that failed citizen-
initiated TELs movements may affect user charge reliance as well in that they could send 
a signal to local officials showing a demand of lower levels of revenue or changes of 
revenue mechanism. Also, passing referenda is a lengthy process during which changes 
in revenues or spending could occur before the TELs take effect. In either case, the 
coefficients on TELs could be biased downward. Conducting intensive case studies may 




Finally, the 2SLS approach in this study has only been applied to the 
specifications using TELs and the number of TELs as the independent variables of 
primary interest. The potential endogeneity problems have not been addressed in the 
specifications using other measures of TELs such as potentially binding and non-binding 
TELs, and each specific type of TELs due to the difficulty of finding an appropriate 
instrument. It is possible that the estimated results on these variables using the 2SLS 
approach may present a rather different pattern from the one obtained from the approach 
that treats these measures of TELs exogenously. Since this study finds evidence 
suggesting the importance of recognizing the endogenous nature of TELs, further 

















Table 2.1 Distributions of Region, Population Size, Metro Status, and Government 
Structure of Sample Cities in 1972 and 2000  
                                     
  
 1972 2000 
Region   
Northeast 136 (19%) 136 (19%) 
Midwest 229 (32%) 229 (32%) 
South 188 (26%) 188 (26%) 
West 171 (24%) 171 (24%) 
    
Population Size     
Over 500,000 26 (4%) 28 (4%) 
250,000-499,999 31 (4%) 38 (5%) 
100,000-249,999 97 (13%) 148 (20%) 
50,000-99,999 218 (30%) 248 (34%) 
25,000-49,999 352 (49%) 262 (36%) 
    
Metro Status     
Central Cities 426 (59%) 434 (60%) 
Suburban Cities 222 (31%) 224 (31%) 
Independent Cities 76 (10%) 66 (9%) 
    
Form of Government     
Mayor-Council 267 (37%) 294 (41%) 
Council-Manager 411 (57%) 417 (58%) 
Commission/Others 46 (6%) 13 (2%) 
 
Note: Numbers in parentheses indicate percentage of the total (724) sample cities; percentages 
may not total 100 due to rounding. 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from U.S. Census Bureau, County and City Data Book (1977 and 



















Table 2.2 TELs and User Charges by Region, 1997 
 
  
 Northeast Midwest South West Total 
Cities, total 134 226 188 171 719
 (19%) (31%) (26%) (24%) (100%)
  
Cities with TELs 111 195 187 170 663
 (83%) (86%) (99%) (99%) (92%)
  
Cities with potentially  93 175 115 159 542
binding TELs (69%) (77%) (61%) (93%) (75%)
  
User charges, total ($mil) $107.7 $45.5 $114.7 $113.2 $91.3
  
User charges, per capita ($) $423.8 $421.6 $875.0 $522.9 $564.7
  
User charges, % of own-
source revenue 28.2% 37.0% 48.6% 38.1% 38.6%
 
Note: Numbers in parentheses indicate percentage of total (719) sample cities or percentage of 
cities in each region in 1997. All monetary terms have been adjusted for inflation using the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) with 2004 as the base year. 
 































User charges per capita ($) User charges divided by population 
  
User charges as a percentage 
of municipal own-source 
revenue (%) 
User charges divided by municipal total own-source revenue 




Policy Variables  
  
TELs A dummy coded 1 if a municipality is subject to TELs, and 0 
otherwise 
  
Number of TELs Total number of different types of TELs according to the 
ACIR’s seven-type classification  
  
Potentially binding TELs A dummy coded 1 if potentially binding TELs exist in a 
municipality, and 0 otherwise 
  
Non-binding TELs A dummy coded 1 if non-binding TELs exist in a 
municipality, and 0 otherwise 
  
Specific types of TELs Dummy variables including overall property tax rate limits, 
specific property tax rate limits, property tax levy limits, 
assessment increase limits, general revenue limits, general 
expenditure limits, and full disclosure  
Fiscal Variables 
  
Taxes per capita ($) Total taxes divided by population 
  
Taxes percentage (%) Total taxes as a percentage of total own-source revenue 
  
IGR per capita ($) Total intergovernmental revenue divided by population 
  
IGR percentage (%) Total intergovernmental revenue as a percentage of total 
revenue 
  
Debt per capita ($) Total debt outstanding divided by population 
  
Debt percentage (%) Total debt outstanding divided by total own-source revenue 
multiplied by 100 
  




traditionally, are relatively important (i.e., sewerage, hospitals, 
airports, solid waste management, parking, water transport, 
water supply, electricity supply, gas supply, and transit 
expenditures) divided by total expenditure of the municipal 
government multiplied by 100 
  
Optional tax A dummy coded 1 if a municipality collects local income 
and/or sales taxes, and 0 otherwise  
  
Special districts The number of special districts in the county where the 






Population Total resident population of the municipality 
  
Per capita income ($) Aggregate personal income in a municipality divided by the 
resident population 
  
Council-manager city A dummy coded 1 if a municipality has a council-manager 
form of government  
  
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES  
  
Passage rate A four-year moving average of passage rate, i.e., the 
percentage of citizen proposed initiatives successfully passed 
in a state where the municipality is located during the previous 
four years 
  
Land area Land area in square miles 
  
Business receipts (mil$) Total gross receipts of business operations in manufacturing, 
wholesale, retail, and taxable service industries 
  
Unemployment rate (%) Percentage of civilian labor force who are unemployed 
  
Non-white (%) Percentage of population who are non-white  
  
Age 18 and under (%) Percentage of population who are at or below the age of 18 
  
Age 65 and over (%) Percentage of population who are at or over the age of 65  
  
Owner-occupied housing (%) Percentage of occupied housing units that are occupied by the 
owner 
  
Central city A dummy coded 1 if a municipality is a core city that is 
located within a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) defined 
by the Office of Management and Budget, as opposed to a 




Table 2.4 Descriptive Statistics of the Full Sample 
 
 Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
     
Dependent Variables     
User charges per capita ($) 469.91 562.32 0 7663.13
User charges as % of own-
source revenue 36.18 19.74 0 93.93
  
Independent Variables  
TELs 0.84 0.37 0 1
Number of TELs 1.72 1.18 0 5
Potentially binding TELs 0.53 0.50 0 1
Non-binding TELs 0.73 0.45 0 1
Overall property tax rate limits 0.25 0.43 0 1
Specific property tax rate limits 0.54 0.50 0 1
Property tax levy limits 0.32 0.47 0 1
Assessment increase limits 0.20 0.40 0 1
General revenue limits 0.02 0.15 0 1
General expenditure limits 0.16 0.36 0 1
Full disclosure 0.23 0.42 0 1
Taxes per capita ($) 526.41 362.65 16.23 3622.98
Taxes percentage (%) 51.22 19.75 2.12 100.00
IGR per capita ($) 350.89 367.87 0 4407.58
IGR percentage (%) 23.19 13.52 0 91.35
Debt per capita ($) 1560.63 1544.39 0 20293.87
Debt percentage (%) 142.49 107.98 0 2825.37
Expenditure mix (%) 29.44 18.31 0 98.21
Optional tax 0.80 0.40 0 1
Special districts 34.50 48.18 0 465
Population 130200 369307 25019 8084316
Per capita income ($) 19517.27 5976.26 6716.00 80149.00
Council-manager city 0.57 0.49 0 1
  
Instrumental  Variables  
Passage rate 0.19 0.28 0 1
Land area (square miles) 42.30 90.30 1.00 1732.00
Business receipts (mil$) 13533.90 46900.04 56.36 1623416.00
Unemployment rate (%) 6.01 2.78 0.70 21.10
Non-white (%) 19.22 17.82 0 98.40
Age 18 and under (%) 25.61 4.45 8.70 44.10
Age 65 and over (%) 11.79 4.19 1.50 51.80
Owner-occupied housing (%) 57.54 12.21 13.40 93.90
Central city 0.60 0.49 0 1
 
Note: Total 23,012 observations. All monetary terms have been adjusted for inflation using the 




Table 2.5 Effects of TELs on User Charge Reliance in 724 Sample Cities, 1970-2004 
(TELs treated exogenously) 
 
  (1) (2) 
 User Charges User Charge 
  Per Capita Percentage 
TELs 130.097 -0.240 
 (37.603)*** (0.486) 
   
Taxes ª 0.327 -0.555 
 (0.068)*** (0.035)*** 
   
IGR ª 0.085 0.033 
 (0.030)*** (0.014)** 
   
Debt ª  0.040 -0.017 
 (0.012)*** (0.002)*** 
   
Expenditure mix (%) 9.374 0.197 
 (1.416)*** (0.020)*** 
   
Optional tax 98.392 1.115 
 (19.782)*** (0.614)* 
   
Special districts 0.062 0.006 
 (0.283) (0.003)* 
   
Population (ln) 139.118 0.536 
 (58.494)** (1.055) 
   
Per capita income (ln) -8.447 2.409 
  (42.654) (0.572)*** 
   
Council-manager city 4.429 -0.298 
 (27.441) (0.605) 
   
Constant  -1736.291 29.990 
 (552.298)*** (11.608)** 
   
R-square 0.387 0.874 
 
Note: Total 23,012 observations. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering within 
states; * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; and *** significant at the 1% 
level. All specifications include city-fixed effects. 
 
ª Taxes per capita, IGR per capita, and debt per capita for column (1); taxes percentage, IGR 






Table 2.6 Effects of TELs on User Charge Reliance in 65 Large Cities, 1970-2004 (TELs 
treated exogenously) 
 
  (1) (2) 
 User Charges  User Charge  
  Per Capita Percentage 
TELs 178.425 0.317 
 (60.061)*** (0.649) 
   
Taxes ª 0.266 -0.564 
 (0.121)** (0.058)*** 
   
IGR ª -0.016 0.022 
 (0.069) (0.030) 
   
Debt ª  0.074 -0.005 
 (0.014)*** (0.004) 
   
Expenditure mix (%) 5.725 0.103 
 (1.360)*** (0.046)** 
   
Optional tax -8.909 -2.452 
 (46.388) (1.553) 
   
Special districts 0.838 0.008 
 (0.411)* (0.004) 
   
Population (ln) 11.879 1.473 
 (90.766) (1.301) 
   
Per capita income (ln) 43.385 2.679 
  (49.779) (0.735)*** 
   
Council-manager city -17.421 1.066 
 (19.536) (0.463)** 
   
Constant  -717.448 18.208 
 (1100.676) (18.605) 
   
R-square 0.454 0.855 
 
Note: Total 2,273 observations. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering within 
states; * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; and *** significant at the 1% 
level. All specifications include city-fixed effects. 
 
ª Taxes per capita, IGR per capita, and debt per capita for column (1); taxes percentage, IGR 





Table 2.7 Effects of TELs on User Charge Reliance in 100 Small Cities, 1970-2004 
(TELs treated exogenously) 
 
  (1) (2) 
 User Charges  User Charge  
  Per Capita Percentage 
TELs 171.657 0.793 
 (35.050)*** (0.859) 
   
Taxes ª 0.245 -0.519 
 (0.075)*** (0.052)*** 
   
IGR ª 0.144 -0.008 
 (0.071)* (0.023) 
   
Debt ª  0.005 -0.019 
 (0.007) (0.005)*** 
   
Expenditure mix (%) 8.213 0.149 
 (2.254)*** (0.038)*** 
   
Optional tax 109.238 1.878 
 (21.279)*** (0.700)** 
   
Special districts 2.358 0.009 
 (0.860)*** (0.018) 
   
Population (ln) 145.630 1.958 
 (141.705) (3.507) 
   
Per capita income (ln) 14.326 3.025 
 (33.816) (0.830)*** 
   
Council-manager city 24.373 -3.053 
 (97.195) (1.349)** 
   
Constant  -1877.899 10.624 
 (1480.890) (35.542) 
   
R-square 0.426 0.859 
 
Note: Total 3,220 observations. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering within 
states; * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; and *** significant at the 1% 
level. All specifications include city-fixed effects. 
 
ª Taxes per capita, IGR per capita, and debt per capita for column (1); taxes percentage, IGR 






Table 2.8 Effects of Potentially Binding and Non-Binding TELs on User Charge Reliance  
 
  (1) (2) 
 User Charges  User Charge  
  Per Capita Percentage 
Full sample (N=23,012)   
   
Potentially binding TELs 156.363  0.368  
 (27.243)*** (0.698) 
   
Non-binding TELs 72.328  -0.291  
 (51.161) (0.804) 
   
Both TELs -80.026  -0.607  
 (34.139)** (0.872) 
Large-city sample (N=2,273)     
   
Potentially binding TELs 113.913 1.374 
 (58.744)* (0.591)** 
   
Non-binding TELs 149.460 0.071 
 (76.793)* (0.789) 
   
Both TELs -78.709 -1.328 
 (81.464) (0.703)* 
Small-city sample (N=3,220)     
   
Potentially binding TELs 168.326 1.923 
 (30.939)*** (0.738)** 
   
Non-binding TELs 155.913 -0.248 
 (52.153)*** (1.092) 
   
Both TELs -125.631 -1.093 
  (43.735)*** (0.939) 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering within states; * significant at the 
10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; and *** significant at the 1% level. All specifications 































Overall property tax rate limits  1.00       
Specific property tax rate limits -0.23 1.00      
Property tax levy limits 0.00 0.19 1.00     
Assessment increase limits 0.51 -0.07 -0.18 1.00    
General revenue limits -0.08 0.14 -0.03 -0.08 1.00   
General expenditure limits 0.52 -0.28 -0.19 0.62 0.02 1.00  
Full disclosure -0.26 0.23 0.22 -0.12 0.06 -0.20 1.00 
 



















Table 2.10 Effects of Specific Types of TELs on User Charge Reliance in 724 Sample 
Cities, 1970-2004 
 
  (1) (2) 
 User Charges  User Charge  
  Per Capita Percentage 
74.523  0.148  Overall property tax rate limits /Assessment 
increase limits /General expenditure limits (17.193)*** (0.669) 
   
Specific property tax rate limits 87.626  1.010  
 (26.657)*** (0.882) 
   
Property tax levy limits 64.201  0.298  
 (21.691)*** (0.801) 
   
General revenue limits -71.464  -3.301  
 (23.797)*** (2.576) 
   
Full disclosure 111.700  -0.363  
  (28.819)*** (0.624) 
 
Note: Total 23,012 observations. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering within 
states; * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; and *** significant at the 1% 




























Table 2.11 Effects of Specific Types of TELs on User Charge Reliance in 65 Large 
Cities, 1970-2004  
 
  (1) (2) 
 User Charges  User Charge  
  Per Capita Percentage 
124.374 1.060 Overall property tax rate limits /Assessment 
increase limits /General expenditure limits (32.217)*** (1.021) 
   
Specific property tax rate limits 61.298 1.352 
 (23.651)** (0.594)** 
   
Property tax levy limits -55.774 -0.132 
 (41.254) (0.667) 
   
General revenue limits -53.599 -0.749 
 (28.072)* (1.819) 
   
Full disclosure 237.503 0.286 
  (58.691)*** (0.595) 
 
Note: Total 2,273 observations. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering within 
states; * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; and *** significant at the 1% 



























Table 2.12 Effects of Specific Types of TELs on User Charge Reliance in 100 Small 
Cities, 1970-2004 
 
  (1) (2) 
 User Charges  User Charge  
  Per Capita Percentage 
71.766 1.455 Overall property tax rate limits /Assessment 
increase limits /General expenditure limits (43.588) (0.698)** 
   
Specific property tax rate limits 108.971 -0.633 
 (57.279)* (1.571) 
   
Property tax levy limits 64.915 1.864 
 (26.599)** (0.882)** 
   
General revenue limits -92.496 -2.164 
 (56.293) (1.526) 
   
Full disclosure 119.081 -1.173 
  (24.419)*** (0.800) 
 
Note: Total 3,222 observations. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering within 
states; * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; and *** significant at the 1% 



























Table 2.13 Variation in the Number of TELs by State, 1970-2004  
 
State Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Alabama 35 1.94 0.24 1 2 
Alaska 35 1.89 0.47 0 2 
Arizona 35 3.43 0.92 2 4 
Arkansas 35 1.83 0.66 1 3 
California 35 2.51 1.46 0 4 
Colorado 35 2.74 1.80 1 5 
Connecticut 35 0.00 0.00 0 0 
Delaware 35 0.00 0.00 0 0 
Florida 35 2.17 0.62 1 3 
Georgia 35 0.40 0.50 0 1 
Hawaii 35 0.00 0.00 0 0 
Idaho 35 2.54 0.89 1 4 
Illinois 35 2.09 0.85 1 3 
Indiana 35 0.91 0.28 0 1 
Iowa 35 1.71 0.57 0 2 
Kansas 35 1.09 1.01 0 2 
Kentucky 35 2.49 0.89 1 3 
Louisiana 35 1.66 0.68 0 2 
Maine 35 0.00 0.00 0 0 
Maryland 35 1.80 0.41 1 2 
Massachusetts 35 1.43 0.92 0 2 
Michigan 35 2.74 1.15 1 4 
Minnesota 35 1.77 0.69 1 3 
Mississippi 35 0.71 0.46 0 1 
Missouri 35 1.71 0.46 1 2 
Montana  35 2.40 0.69 1 3 
Nebraska 35 2.11 1.35 1 4 
Nevada 35 3.34 1.11 2 5 
New Hampshire 35 0.00 0.00 0 0 
New Jersey 35 0.83 0.38 0 1 
New Mexico 35 3.40 1.06 1 4 
New York 35 1.54 0.51 1 2 
North Carolina 35 0.91 0.28 0 1 
North Dakota 35 1.69 0.47 1 2 
Ohio 35 1.83 0.38 1 2 
Oklahoma 35 1.26 0.44 1 2 
Oregon 35 1.86 1.24 1 4 
Pennsylvania 35 1.00 0.00 1 1 
Rhode Island 35 1.31 0.87 0 2 
South Carolina 35 0.86 0.36 0 1 
South Dakota 35 1.00 0.00 1 1 
Tennessee 35 0.74 0.44 0 1 
Texas 35 2.31 0.96 1 3 
Utah 35 2.00 0.00 2 2 




Virginia 35 0.83 0.38 0 1 
Washington 35 3.31 0.72 1 4 
West Virginia 35 2.43 0.50 2 3 
Wisconsin 35 0.00 0.00 0 0 













































Table 2.14 Effects of the Number of TELs on User Charge Reliance in 724 Sample 
Cities, 1970-2004 (TELs treated exogenously) 
 
  (1) (2) 
 User Charges  User Charge  
  Per Capita Percentage 
Number of TELs 57.201  -1.109  
 (11.361)*** (0.513)** 
   
Number of TELs squared  0.269  
    (0.130)** 
 
Note: Total 23,012 observations. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering within 
states; * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; and *** significant at the 1% 



































Table 2.15 Effects of TELs on User Charge Reliance in 724 Sample Cities, 1970-2004 
(TELs treated endogenously) 
 
  (1) (2) 
 User Charges  User Charge  
 Per Capita Percentage 
TELs 1080.280  7.545  
 (543.163)** (4.162)* 
   
Taxes ª -0.556  -0.283  
 (0.650) (0.149)* 
   
IGR ª -1.257  -0.172  
 (0.908) (0.128) 
   
Debt ª  0.100  -0.011  
 (0.038)*** (0.003)*** 
   
Expenditure mix (%) -60.816  0.066  
 (37.325) (0.226) 
   
Optional tax 40.850  0.817  
 (50.999) (1.037) 
   
Special districts -2.606  -0.016  
 (1.551)* (0.011) 
   
Population (ln) -325.527  -3.222  
 (220.913) (1.270)** 
   
Per capita income (ln) 155.455  0.815  
 (120.111) (0.923) 
   
Council-manager city -125.810  -0.686  
 (114.545) (0.835) 
      
First-stage F-statistic 14.280  10.930  
   
Overidentifying restrictions  4.508  7.856  
J-test and p-value (0.479) (0.164) 
   
Hausman endogeneity test 118.380*** 190.260*** 
   
Endogenous variables TELs, Taxes, IGR, and Expenditure mix 




Passage rate, Land area (ln), Business receipts 
(ln), Unemployment rate, Non-white, Age 18, 





Note: Total 23,012 observations. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering within 
states; * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; and *** significant at the 1% 
level. All specifications include city-fixed effects. 
 
ª Taxes per capita, IGR per capita, and debt per capita for column (1); taxes percentage, IGR 












































Table 2.16 Effects of TELs on User Charge Reliance in 65 Large Cities (TELs treated 
endogenously) 
 
  (1) (2) 
 User Charges  User Charge  
 Per Capita Percentage 
TELs 574.002 8.432 
 (303.751)* (7.814) 
   
Taxes ª 0.598 -0.363 
 (0.433) (0.302) 
   
IGR ª -0.556 -0.153 
 (0.182)*** (0.178) 
   
Debt ª  0.063 -0.001 
 (0.029)** (0.005) 
   
Expenditure mix (%) -10.490 -0.367 
 (17.782) (0.673) 
   
Optional tax 35.856 -2.077 
 (89.558) (2.979) 
   
Special districts 0.448 0.006 
 (0.244)* (0.008) 
   
Population (ln) -169.600 -2.156 
 (100.533)* (2.506) 
   
Per capita income (ln) 24.580 1.390 
 (91.780) (1.589) 
   
Council-manager city 76.831 3.182 
 (88.409) (3.114) 
      
First-stage F-statistic 11.290  7.660  
   
Overidentifying restrictions  N/A N/A 
J-test and p-value   
   
Hausman endogeneity test 129.110*** 46.680*** 
   
Endogenous variables TELs, Taxes, IGR, and Expenditure mix 




Passage rate, Land area (ln), Business receipts 
(ln), Unemployment rate, Non-white, Age 18, 





Note: Total 2,273 observations. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering within 
states; * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; and *** significant at the 1% 
level. All specifications include city-fixed effects. 
 
ª Taxes per capita, IGR per capita, and debt per capita for column (1); taxes percentage, IGR 

























Table 2.17 Effects of TELs on User Charge Reliance in 100 Small Cities (TELs treated 
endogenously) 
 
  (1) (2) 
 User Charges  User Charge  
 Per Capita Percentage 
TELs 1087.994 14.748 
 (519.853)* (8.547)* 
   
Taxes ª 0.316 -0.218 
 (0.617) (0.226) 
   
IGR ª -0.857 -0.266 
 (0.936) (0.214) 
   
Debt ª  0.027 -0.009 
 (0.024) (0.008) 
   
Expenditure mix (%) 4.691 0.399 
 (37.392) (0.420) 
   
Optional tax 54.694 1.313 
 (78.612) (1.152) 
   
Special districts -5.852 -0.062 
 (5.086) (0.037) 
   
Population (ln) 124.229 1.734 
 (176.701) (4.519) 
   
Per capita income (ln) -46.749 0.910 
 (111.818) (1.906) 
   
Council-manager city -44.698 -3.084 
 (220.608) (2.289) 
      
First-stage F-statistic 13.220  7.170  
   
Overidentifying restrictions  4.369  4.224  
J-test and p-value (0.498) (0.518) 
   
Hausman endogeneity test 89.860*** 25.790*** 
   
Endogenous variables TELs, Taxes, IGR, and Expenditure mix 




Passage rate, Land area (ln), Business receipts 
(ln), Unemployment rate, Non-white, Age 18, 





Note: Total 3,222 observations. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering within 
states; * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; and *** significant at the 1% 
level. All specifications include city-fixed effects. 
 
ª Taxes per capita, IGR per capita, and debt per capita for column (1); taxes percentage, IGR 












































Table 2.18 Effects of the Number of TELs on User Charge Reliance in 724 Sample Cities 
(TELs treated endogenously) 
 
  (1) (2) 
 User Charges  User Charge  
 Per Capita Percentage 
Number of TELs 212.153  -0.394  
 (55.685)*** (0.918) 
   
Number of TELs squared  0.513  
    (0.543) 
   
First-stage F-statistic 14.280  15.470  
   
Overidentifying restrictions  1.759  8.548  
J-test and p-value (0.881) (0.128) 
   
Hausman endogeneity test 184.480*** 233.820*** 
   
Endogenous variables TELs, Taxes, IGR, and Expenditure mix 




Passage rate, Land area (ln), Business receipts 
(ln), Unemployment rate, Non-white, Age 18, 
Age 65, Owner-occupied housing, and Central 
city 
 
Note: Total 23,012 observations. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering within 
states; * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; and *** significant at the 1% 








































Source: Author’s calculations from U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Survey of State and Local 






































Note: Percentages are based on a sample of 722 cities in 1970, 724 cities in 1980, 708 cities in 
1990 and 719 cities in 1997. 
 































































Note: Percentages are based on a sample of 722 cities in 1970, 724 cities in 1980, 708 cities in 
1990 and 719 cities in 1997. 
 





































































Note: Percentages are based on a sample of 722 cities in 1970, 724 cities in 1980, 708 cities in 
1990 and 719 cities in 1997. 
 



























Figure 2.5 Municipal Own-Source Revenues for Cities with or without TELs, 1997 
 
Cities with TELs 
(663 cities) 
 





Source: Author’s calculations from U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Survey of State and Local 































Figure 2.6 Municipal Own-Source Revenues for Cities with Potentially Binding and Non-
Binding TELs, 1997 
 
Cities with potentially binding TELs 
(542 cities) 
 




Source: Author’s calculations from U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Survey of State and Local 

















Chapter 3: User Charges and Municipal Expenditures 
3.1 Introduction 
In the United States, significant variation exists in the types of user charges and 
fees that are utilized by municipal governments. Netzer (1992), for instance, identified 
thirteen public service areas that have commonly relied on user charge financing by local 
governments, grouping these service areas into three categories: transportation activities 
(highway and parking, transit, air transportation, and water transportation), energy and 
environmental activities (water supply, electric power supply, gas supply, sewerage, solid 
waste management, parks and recreation, and natural resources), and selected other 
activities (hospitals, and housing and community development). Depending on the size 
and demands of local residents, the presence of special districts, and other factors, 
different cities choose to provide different packages of charge-financed services.  
As with the significant variation in the types of user charges, variation is also 
observed in the composition of financing methods for charge-financed services among 
cities. In most cities, charges typically do not cover the full costs (including current 
operating cost and capital cost) of the service in question except for a few service areas 
such as parking services and gas and electricity supplies. The remaining costs are usually 
covered (or subsidized) with a combination of general funds (taxes), intergovernmental 
grants, and other funding sources (Bierhanzl & Downing, 2004; Downing, 1992; ICMA, 
2002). Economic, political and practical considerations are contemplated to determine the 
extent to which local governments utilize user charges in order to finance various public 




services resemble private sector outputs: that is, these goods and services provide 
significant private benefits to identifiable individuals or business firms, it is feasible to 
exclude non-beneficiaries, and the costs of services are measurable (ACIR, 1987). In 
addition, there are political and practical considerations in developing a user charge 
financing system. These include consumer acceptance, equity issues, externalities, 
administrative costs, and so forth (Bierhanzl & Downing, 2004). For example, many 
cities charge nearly full costs of services such as sewerage, sanitation, and water supply 
since a large portion of the benefits of these services are private and most citizens readily 
understand and accept user charges for such services. In contrast, since participation in 
recreation gives the youth an alternative to negative externality-producing activities (e.g., 
crime), and since excluding the poor from the service by imposing charges for the entry 
might be inequitable, many municipal governments subsidize their recreation facilities by 
offering free entry to municipal parks (especially when the administrative cost of a 
complex fee structure is too high) or charging at a reduced price for youth groups or low-
income residents.  
Reflecting the above financing considerations, revenues from user charges as a 
percentage of expenditure for selected services vary widely among different services. 
Table 3.1 illustrates this variation based on aggregated data on total U.S. cities. On 
average, for example, municipal user charges for highways appear to cover about 6% of 
total highway expenditure in 2002, for parks and recreation 22%, for solid waste 
management 58%, for hospitals 62%, for airports 81%, for sewerage 92%, and for 
parking 121%. Historically, the importance of user charges for most services remained 




transit services. Charges for sewerage and solid waste management showed steady 
increases over the past 30 years while public transit charges experienced a considerable 
decline. These national average figures provide some insights into the difference between 
the cost of services and how much citizens have to pay directly as a charge, although 
variations in service quality may exist across regions and cities. 
User charge financing is different from general tax financing in that user charge 
financing restores a direct relationship between the service received and payment 
rendered. This enables consumers to properly evaluate the service, thereby discouraging 
excessive or wasteful consumption of the service. Based on this line of reasoning, 
scholars have proposed that a greater degree of reliance on user charge financing leads to 
a more efficient provision of services than does the tax financing (Bailey, 1994a; 
Wagner, 1976). However, with the exception of Bierhanzl and Downing (1998), which 
found that an increase in user charge reliance reduces the total expenditure for sewer 
service, no other studies have yet found to empirically examine whether the degree of 
reliance on user charges affects the expenditure level of charge-financed services.  
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the consequences of user charge 
financing on municipal expenditures with a focus on two specific public programs—the 
sewer service and parks and recreation service. Using the fixed effects regression 
technique on a panel of municipalities with populations over 25,000 from 1972 to 2004, 
empirical findings suggest that a greater degree of user charge reliance on the sewer and 
parks and recreation services leads to a reduced level of government expenditures for 
these functions, though the magnitude of the reduction effect for the sewer service is 




The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides a brief 
overview of the pricing system of user charges. Section 3.3 reviews existing literatures on 
the subject. Section 3.4 describes the data and outlines the methods employed in the 
study. Section 3.5 reports major findings. Finally, section 3.6 offers conclusions and 
suggestions for future research.  
 
3.2 Pricing System of User Charges 
Depending on the nature of the services, the pricing of user charges reflects 
different cost structures: some include operating costs only (e.g., salaries, supplies, and 
contractual service), while others include full costs (the costs of current outputs plus 
capital costs of financing the infrastructure). Opportunity costs are sometimes involved in 
the pricing system as well. For example, some recreation and emergency medical service 
charges are primarily designed to cover operating costs only because of the concern 
among public managers that governments may price themselves out of the markets if 
charging the services at a market price (McCarthy, 1986). Other charges such as charges 
for water supply, sewerage, and solid waste management services typically include a high 
percentage of both operating and capital costs due to the capital-intensive nature of the 
services. Another good example is parking services. In order to defray the costs of 
installation, maintenance and supervision of the meters, and to recover some of the 
opportunity costs of land devoted to parking lots or garages, the fees collected for parking 
services in most cities generally exceed the annual expenditure on parking.  
In pricing charges, a variety of factors (e.g., location, distance, and volume) are 




consumers (sectors). In the case of sewer services, there is large variation in the sewerage 
charge formulas employed by municipalities and sanitary districts. Some municipalities 
simply charge a flat rate per month or per quarter for all service users or all users within a 
group (e.g., $10 per month for single family residence, and $7 per month for each unit in 
a multi-family dwelling), while other jurisdictions adopt more complicated formulas 
based on the amount of water used, plumbing fixtures (such as garbage grinders in 
residences, wash-racks in service stations, and washing machines in commercial 
laundries), water meters and sewer connections, assessed property values, or a 
combination of two or more of these factors. For industrial sewage, sewer strength 
(pollution potential) is frequently utilized as the basis for pricing (Bierhanzl & Downing, 
2004; Johnson, 1969).  
 In the case of parks and recreation services, ICMA’s 2001 survey (for 1,563 
cities with varying population sizes and for 215 counties with populations of 50,000 and 
above) provides recent information on the use of charges (ICMA, 2002). According to 
the survey results, about 89% of responding local governments provide parks and 
recreation services. Those cities that do not provide these services indicated that another 
city, county, regional authority, special district, or organization provides the service. With 
respect to funding sources, responding cities cited general funds, revenue from another 
local government, private grants, state grants, federal grants, user charges and fees, and 
self fund-raisings were frequently used financing methods. Recreation facilities that 
generate user charge revenues include community centers, playgrounds, tennis courts, 
swimming pools, water parks, soccer fields, sport stadiums, campgrounds, gymnasiums, 




many of above services for free. However, for some selective services, local governments 
impose fixed or variable charges. For example, many cities impose charges for parks and 
recreation facilities only during peak demand periods, while public golf courses charge 
for all users at all times and adopt higher rates on weekends.   
 
3.3 Literature Review 
3.3.1 Theoretical Arguments 
Public finance and public choice literature indicates that government 
bureaucracies are inefficiently large because bureaucrats are able to exploit their 
monopoly position to force citizen-consumers into an all-or-nothing demand curve (i.e., a 
demand curve under an all-or-nothing pricing arrangement) especially under tax 
financing of public services (Niskanen, 1971). While managers of private firms are 
assumed to be profit maximizers, bureaucrats cannot benefit from any profits that might 
be generated by their organization. Instead, they are viewed as seeking to maximize the 
size of their organization’s budget, especially the “discretionary budget,” at the expense 
of citizens (Niskanen, 1975). This view is widely known as the “budget-maximizing” 
theory. Following this theory, Downing (1981) suggests that if consumers do not have 
good information about the activities of bureaucrats, governments will produce public 
goods and services at a larger-than-efficient quantity and at a higher-than-efficient cost. 
An alternative view of bureaucratic behavior is “fiscal illusion” theory. This 
theory suggests that when government revenues are unobserved or not fully observed by 




Thus, from the politician’s perspective, the existence of a fiscal illusion enables a 
politician to select a revenue mechanism that maximizes the extent to which spending can 
be increased without attracting public attention, while at the same time, this same revenue 
mechanism will tend to promote greater-than-optimal consumption on the part of 
taxpayers by concealing from them the true costs of public services (Wagner, 1976)  
Based on Puviani (1903) and Buchanan’s (1967) work, Wagner (1976) introduced 
the concept of “revenue complexity” in his study of the impact of revenue structure on 
fiscal illusion and budgetary choices. The central theme of his study, as with his two 
predecessors, is that the institutional arrangement on taxation affects taxpayer perceptions 
about the price or cost of government and, thereby the level of public expenditure. From 
both conceptual and empirical perspectives, Wagner explained how the method used to 
finance public services influence taxpayer perceptions, especially how complex, multi-
based revenue structures matter, and how alternative degree of revenue complexity 
affects budgetary outcomes. As a conclusion, Wagner recommends a relatively simple 
revenue structure that can make citizens “understand better and perceive more clearly” 
the budgetary consequences of fiscal institutions (Wagner, 1976, p. 59). 
Besides revenue complexity, researchers find that other circumstances may cause 
fiscal illusion as well. One circumstance is the income elasticity of the revenue system. 
An income elastic tax structure is assumed to be able to attract larger increments of 
general income and this increase will be “automatically” reflected on the expenditure side 
(Oates, 1975). A further source of fiscal illusion is the “flypaper effect,” which holds that 
there is a tendency for categorical lump-sum grants to increase public expenditure by 




Knight, 2000; Singhal, 2006). Fiscal illusion can also be derived from “renter illusion,” 
which argues that only property owners can correctly perceive the tax price of the local 
public good while the renters misperceive the level of public good and services and the 
level of rents paid. This is especially the case for jurisdictions where property taxes serve 
as the primary revenue for local governments and are directly levied on property owners 
rather than renters (Bergstrom & Goodman, 1973). The final form of fiscal illusion is 
“debt illusion” which is caused by imperfect information available to individuals on the 
time path of the future benefits or costs of governmental activity. In this case, voters are 
less aware of the costs of public sector programs if they are paid for through government 
borrowing rather than current taxation thus leading to higher public expenditures (Floyd 
& Hynes, 1978).  
An examination of the existing literature indicates that it is not altogether clear 
whether fiscal illusion is the result of shortsightedness on the part of voters that allows 
for temporary increase in government expenditures or the consequence of “permanent 
astigmatism” that obscures the true size of government (Mueller, 2003, p. 529). The tax 
revolts in the 1970s reveal that fiscal illusion may not necessarily have a detrimental 
effect on the public’s understanding or involvement concerning issues of public finance. 
Rather, citizens will inevitably oppose irresponsible government spending and attempt to 
limit government expenditures by calling for greater political accountability and 
institutional restraint (Mueller, 2003). 
Since a properly priced user charge financing scheme can restore a direct 
relationship between the service received and payment rendered, theoretical discussions 




valuable information about the costs of their consumption and reduce the ability of a 
government agency to extract rent from taxpayers (Bailey, 1994a; Bierhanzl & Downing, 
1998, 2004). This line of reasoning argues that the absence of a consumption-payment 
link under the general tax financing scheme may lead to an absence of incentives for 
taxpayers to consume goods and services efficiently, thus causing wasteful consumption 
of existing public goods and services. Properly priced user charges, in contrast, act in a 
manner similar to market price in the private sector and could restore such relationship 
between the consumption and payment. In this way it may be possible to persuade 
taxpayers to consume less goods and services than they would under a traditional tax 
financing system since taxpayers under the charge financing system must bear the full 
cost of their increased consumption (Bierhanzl & Downing, 1998). The underlying 
assumption of this argument is that public demand for charge-financed goods or services 
is fairly elastic or at least not perfectly inelastic, so that resource allocation and service 
utilization would be sensitive to the pricing system of user charges.  
In addition to providing citizens with more accurate information regarding the 
costs of consumption of certain public goods and services, user charges may also provide 
public officials with invaluable information on consumer preferences for public goods 
and services, thereby assisting them in making long-run investment decisions on the 
types and levels of services provided. Such policy-making patterns could prevent local 
governments from “providing the wrong level of output at too high a cost to the wrong 
people” (ACIR, 1987, p. 31). In fact, ACIR (1987) suggests that government may expand 




Based on these arguments, scholars have proposed that a greater degree of 
reliance on user charge financing could result in potential efficiency gains in terms of 
reduction in the level of service demands and possible cost savings from more efficient 
service delivery compared with a traditional tax financing scheme (e.g., property taxes), 
provided that the administrative costs of collecting charges are relatively low and 
alternative tax measures related to service usage can be devised (Bailey, 1994a; Bierhanzl 
& Downing, 1998, 2004; ACIR, 1987; Wagner, 1976). This efficiency-enhancing effect 
of user charges is closely in line with the economic concept of “allocative efficiency” 
which states that when the marginal benefit of consuming additional units of a good 
equals the marginal cost of producing the units, the quantity of the good in the market 
will reach the efficient level. It is important to distinguish this concept of efficiency from 
that of “productive efficiency,” a situation which occurs when the production of a 
particular quantity of a good is achieved using the fewest possible resources or at the 
lowest possible cost. From what has been discussed, user charges seem to be more 
directly associated with allocative efficiency than to productive efficiency, although it is 
possible that user charges could improve efficiency in both fronts. 
 
3.3.2 Empirical Analysis 
Despite the theoretical discussions presented above, empirical studies have 
provided little demonstrable evidence that a greater degree of reliance on user charge 
financing would lead to enhanced efficiency for delivering public services. For example, 
in examining the municipal solid waste management services, Savas, Baumol, and Wells 




taxes, flat fees, and variable fees) and the volume of waste generated, the frequency of 
collection or the place of collection. Their study, however, suffers serious methodology 
flaws due to the lack of statistical correlation measures and regression analysis 
controlling for factors that may affect the demand and supply of the service. Another 
study, Mercer and Morgan (1983), compared the actual user charges with a projected cost 
time series using data on 34 sample cities and 22 sample counties in California between 
1977 and 1982, and found that overall, cities performed better than counties in efficiency 
terms over time and small counties performed better than do large counties. However, 
their study is limited in that their method of cost determination did not involve capital 
costs, an important part for capital-intensive services such as water and sewer services, 
and thus their efficiency measures based on the ratio of user charges to such estimated 
costs are biased. To date, Bierhanzl and Downing’s (1998) study was the only empirical 
piece that has directly and systematically investigated whether a higher degree of reliance 
on user charge financing results in improved efficiency measured by the expenditure on 
charge-financed services. Using data from the 1990 Census Survey of Governments, 
Bierhanzl and Downing (1998) evaluated the sewer service of 751 U.S. cities in 1990 and 
found that the employment of user charge financing mechanism significantly reduced 
government spending levels on sewer services.  
Bierhanzl and Downing’s seminal work provided a helpful analytic approach in 
connecting the theoretical argument about the efficiency-enhancing effect of user charges 
to the actual economic effect of user charge financing. However, their study is limited 
and incomplete for a number of reasons. First and foremost, Bierhanzl and Downing’s 




about efficiency gains through user charge financing should be interpreted with great 
caution. Second, their study only explored limited samples for a single cross-sectional 
year. Since a cross-sectional study cannot capture initial capital costs required in the 
delivery of most types of charge-financed services and the change in expenditure levels 
may possess a different pattern in the long-run from that in the short-run, an examination 
of a longitudinal dataset for specific types of charge-financed services is necessary to 
better capture the effects of user charge financing. Third, Bierhanzl and Downing’s study 
only examined a single service function—the sewer service.7 Since the degree of user 
charge reliance and the resulting level of government spending on charge-financed 
services vary extensively among different types of public services, an examination of a 
pooled dataset for more than one function of services is needed in order to reveal more 
detailed information on the research topic. Fourth, Bierhanzl and Downing’s analysis 
only controlled for a limited number of factors that were expected to affect government 
expenditures on sewerage. The factors considered in their analysis include population, 
growth rates of population from 1980 to 1990, population density, income, and the 
percentage of owner-occupied housing. However, municipal expenditures often depend 
on various political, demographic, economic, and fiscal features that vary across cities 
and change over time. A more thorough analysis should take into account those factors as 
well. Last but not least, in Bierhanzl and Downing’s empirical model, the dependent 
variable, total expenditure, enters as part of explanatory variables in the statistical 
equation, which may cause serious simultaneity problem that biases the estimated results. 
                                                 
7 Bierhanzl and Downing stated that similar regressions were also run for parking services and for parks 
and recreation services, which showed similar results as for the sewer service, but the regression results and 





Alternative model specification should be developed to correct or alleviate such 
mathematical simultaneity problem. Hence, in order to examine and explain the effect of 
user charges on municipal expenditure levels, this study intends to conduct a more careful 
empirical analysis that builds upon Bierhanzl and Downing’s conceptual framework but 
addresses the above limitations with an alternative model specification. It should be noted 
that due to the difficulty in measuring the quality and output of public services, this study 
does not attempt to draw broad conclusions concerning the efficiency of charge-financed 
government services.  
 
3.4 Data and Methods 
3.4.1 Data and Unit of Analysis 
This study extends the time frame of Bierhanzl and Downing’s work from a 
limited cross-sectional study to a cross-sectional time series analysis for sample cities 
with populations of 25,000 or above in 1970 during a 33-year period (1972 through 
2004). The samples used in this study are based on the dataset developed in the previous 
chapter—Chapter 2. Thus, the data came from the same sources: the Census Bureau’s 
Annual Survey of Local Government Finances and Census of Government (1970-2004); 
County and City Data Book (1972, 1977, 1983, 1988, 1994 and 2000); and ICMA’s 
Municipal Form of Government Survey (1981, 1986, 1991, 1996 and 2001) and 
Municipal Year Book (1971, 1974 and 1977). Due to missing values (in particular total 
expenditures and tax revenues) for some cities for at least one year during the study 




sample”) consists of 20,402 observations for 686 cities from 1972 to 2004 or 90% of the 
possible city-years; and the dataset for the parks and recreation service (“park sample”) 
consists of 21,955 observations for 715 cities from 1972 to 2004 or 93% of the possible 
city-years. 
Instead of lumping together the total amount of user charge revenues into a single 
category, this study analyzes two specific charge-financed municipal services—sewer 
service and parks and recreation service. A selection of two specific services, rather than 
concentrating on the aggregate user charges across different service areas or on a single 
type of service charges (as in Bierhanzl and Downing’s study), allows us to make 
comparisons among services, and thus better understand the effect of user charges. The 
primary reason for choosing sewer service and parks and recreation service is that the 
budgetary norm for public sector sewer service has been full-cost (operating cost plus 
capital cost) recovery, while it has been the common practice that covers only operating 
cost for parks and recreation service (Bierhanzl & Downing, 1998; Netzer, 1992). In 
addition, sanitary sewer systems (i.e., systems for collection and treatment of sewerage 
from houses or industry) are more likely to be supported by user charges than many other 
local government services. Benefits from sewer provision are clearly identifiable, easy to 
administer (they are commonly added to user’s water bills) and there is little public 
opposition to charges for such service (Bierhanzl & Downing, 1998). In contrast, public 
parks have a very limited scope for user charges. Because of the general public benefits 
from the service provided and equity concerns, user charges collected in parks are most 
commonly limited to the form of parking fees and any franchise fees paid by 




departments are probably under considerable pressure to adopt some form of benefit-
based charges. Thus, user charges for parks and recreations service typically recover 
between one-quarter and two-thirds of operating costs (Bailey, 1994b). This contrasting 
situation provides a good avenue to conduct a comparative study for the sewer service 
and parks and recreation service.  
Another reason for choosing these two service is that, of the thirteen most widely 
utilized charge functions cited above, sewerage and parks and recreation services are two 
of the most important municipal functions and the majority of cities with population 
exceeding 25,000 tend to provide these services either fully or partially (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 1962-2004). Moreover, unlike some other types of charge-based services that are 
lumped together under the category of “others”, which makes it very difficult to 
disaggregate the financial data, charge collections for sewer service and parks and 
recreation service and their total expenditure for each service are clearly disaggregated in 
the Census dataset. All the above factors make sewer and park and recreation services 
good candidates for the analysis.     
 
3.4.2 Variables and Model 
Following Bierhanzl and Downing (1998), this study proposes the following 
hypothesis: a higher degree of reliance on user charge revenue reduces the level of 
government expenditure for the charge-financed service.  
Two dependent variables in the study include total sewerage expenditures and 
total parks and recreation expenditures. The Census data on both expenditures include 




period from 1972 to 2004. The independent variable of primary interest is user charge 
reliance (UCR), defined as user charge revenue for the service divided by expenditures 
for that service. UCRSEW denotes user charge reliance of sewerage service (i.e., 
UCRSEW = sewerage charges/total sewerage expenditure), and UCRPARK represents 
user charge reliance of parks and recreation service (i.e., UCRPARK = park and 
recreation charges/total park and recreation expenditure). As such, user charges are 
measured in a relative term, as opposed to an absolute dollar amount. This approach of 
measurement helps determine how closely the charge revenue represents a full budget 
cost of the charge-financed service, and the measure can also be easily applied to various 
sizes of jurisdictions. To alleviate the mathematical simultaneity problem caused by the 
presence of expenditure in both dependent variables and independent variables—a major 
flaw of Bierhanzl and Downing’s study—a three-year moving average of UCR is 
calculated and enters the statistical model instead of the annual UCR. Although this 
measurement cannot completely eliminate the simultaneity problem that Bierhanzl and 
Downing’s study also has, it helps smooth out the trends in government expenditures and 
revenues and thus reduces the bias in estimation. Nonetheless, caution should be 
exhibited in that the results might still be biased upward to a certain extent due to the 
potential simultaneity issue.  
Alternative measures of UCR might be total or per capita dollar amount of a 
specific charge. The advantage of using these measures is that they can solve the 
mathematical simultaneity problem caused by having expenditures on both sides of the 
regression equation, but the disadvantage is that they may raise another type of 




could result in changes in user charges, and vice versa. Thus the direction of the causality 
would be difficult to determine. 
Since expenditure reflects demand for the level of output, a method for estimating 
demand functions of individuals for municipal public services is required (Deacon, 1979; 
Deno & Mehay, 1987). According to the median voter hypothesis, a local government 
elected by majority rules provides the level of service that is most preferred by the 
median voter (Bergstrom & Goodman, 1973; Bierhanzl & Downing, 1998; Deacon, 
1979; Deno & Mehay, 1987). Basic median voter’s demand function for governmental 
services can be expressed as:  
jj YbNbTbAG lnlnlnlnln 321 +++=                                                               (3.1)   
where: 
 G is the total amount of public goods supplied;  
 A is any underlying differences in functional responsibility for services across 
cities and other differences in cities themselves; variables included in this shift parameter 
vary depending on the context of the study and the availability of the data; 
 Tj is the median voter (j)’s tax share of the local public good, which measures the 
increment in the household’s tax burden caused by an extra dollar of public expenditure;  
 N is the number of people sharing the local public good, i.e., city population; and 
 Yj is median voter (j)’s income.  
Since the model is based on the assumption that median voters largely decide the 
fiscal outcome of the jurisdiction, the median voter’s tax share is an important variable in 
the demand function. Given the key role of the property tax in local finance, the variable 




in a jurisdiction, which is citizens’ share of local property tax bill. Unfortunately, for this 
study, although the dataset for median home value is available for 1970, 1980, 1990 and 
2000, the gross assessed property values for all sample cities during the study period are 
not available. Therefore, the median voter’s tax share is not included in the regression 
model. 
 The general equation for the expenditure model of charge-financed services, thus, 
can be written as: 
itiitititit XFUCREXP εδααα ++++= 321                                                          (3.2) 
where: 
EXPit is total expenditure for sewer service or for parks and recreation service for 
municipality i in year t; 
UCRit is a three-year moving average of user charge reliance defined as the 
average of user charge revenue for the charge-financed service for municipality i during 
the previous three years (i.e., years t, t-1 and t-2) divided by the three-year average of 
expenditure for that service; this variable is replaced with other measures in different 
model specifications; 
Fit is a vector of fiscal variables for municipality i in year t, including total 
intergovernmental revenue (IGR) and the number of special districts (i.e., “sewer 
districts” for sewer service, and “park districts” for parks and recreation service);  
Xit is a vector of social-economic variables for municipality i in year t that are 
expected to affect the demand of the services, including population, land area, median 
family income, percentage of owner-occupied housing, percentage of population at age 
65 and above, and percentage of non-white population;  




itε is the error term. 
All variables (including the dependent variables) except dummy variables are in 
log form. In addition, all monetary terms are adjusted for inflation using the Consumer 
Price Index (CPI) with 2004 as the base year.  
Population, land area, and median family income are included to account for the 
demand and cost for public services. Intergovernmental revenue from federal, state and 
other local governments, in particular the unrestricted block grants, can be counted as 
additional income for city residents if the municipal government substitutes the grants for 
locally raised revenue. In the case of matching grants, there may be a price effect as well 
as an income effect on the demand for local public services in that the matching grant 
may reduce the tax price to city residents by the fraction of the unit cost of the local 
public good financed by the grantor (Oates, 1979). Under fiscal illusion, voters may fail 
to observe the lump-sum grant or misperceive its impact as an average price effect and 
thus are willing to support a higher level of government spending. Nevertheless, if the 
municipal government—the grantee—acts as a budget-maximizer and chooses to spend 
more than the amount of the intergovernmental grants, there is no substitution effect 
(Courant, Gramlich, & Rubinfeld, 1979; Holsey, 1993; Romer & Rosenthal, 1982; 
Turnbull & Mitias, 1999). In either case, however, the effect of intergovernmental 
revenue is expected to be positive on government expenditures. 
Since sewer service and parks and recreation service in some regions are provided 
through special districts rather than municipal governments, the number of special 




variable.8 According to their designated functions, the Census Bureau classifies 33 types 
of special districts including single-function special districts and multi-function districts. 
I count the number of sewer districts including single-function sewerage districts and 
multi-function sewerage-and-water supply districts and the number of park districts 
including single-function parks and recreation districts only. A larger number of special 
districts are expected to result in a lower level of municipal spending on the services that 
are provided fully or partially from the special districts. 
Finally, to capture voter preferences of public services, percentage of population 
over 65 years of age, percentage of population that is non-white, and percentage of 
owner-occupied housing units are employed in the study. According to the renter’s 
illusion hypothesis, since renters do not directly pay property taxes and thus are less 
aware of tax increases than homeowners, renters are more likely to favor expansions in 
the local budget than homeowners. If this is true, the percentage of owner-occupied 
housing would be negatively associated with the government spending level (Bergstrom 
& Goodman, 1973; Martinez-Vazquez, 1983).  
 
3.5 Research Findings 
This study employs a fixed effects regression model with cluster-robust standard 
errors. The fixed effects model helps to control for any omitted unobserved factors that 
differ across cities but are constant over time. In addition, the standard errors are 
                                                 
8 It would be ideal to identify the exact number of special districts serving the municipality. However, such 
data are unavailable and difficult to calculate due to the fact that many special districts serve areas across 
city or even county boundaries. Therefore, the number of special districts within a county area is used as a 




clustered on the variable identifying each municipality to account for intra-group 
variations, which helps correct potential heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation problems.   
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 present descriptive statistics of the variables for the sewer 
sample and for the park sample, respectively. As the tables show, there are large 
variations in government spending levels, revenue structures, and socio-economic 
characteristics among the sample cities, which justifies the use of regression models to 
capture the effects of user charge financing on municipal expenditures. 
Tables 3.4 and 3.5 summarize the distribution of the three-year moving averages 
of UCRSEW and UCRPARK, respectively. For analytical and regression purposes, 
UCRSEW and UCRPARK are grouped along with five brackets at an interval of 0.5 for 
UCRSEW and 0.1 for UCRPARK. For example, UCRSEW 0-0.5 indicates the UCRSEW 
score between 0 and 0.5 and UCRPARK 0-0.1 indicates the UCRPARK score between 0 
and 0.1; and other brackets follow this pattern.   
At first glance, 38.2% of sample cities (with UCRSEW≥1.0) rely on user charges 
to cover the full budget cost of sewer service (see Table 3.4). However, Bierhanzl and 
Downing (1998) suggests that a typical municipal budget does not include depreciation or 
rent of previous capital investments and land expenditure, thus it is not clearly known 
how much the budget cost understates the true full cost (current operating plus capital 
costs) of service delivery. Since sewer service is capital-intensive, Bierhanzl and 
Downing propose that a UCRSEW of 1.5 or 2.0 could be more representative of a charge 
structure which covers the full cost. If this is the case, only about 10% of total 




charges below the full cost. This suggests that sewer service is heavily subsidized by 
general taxes or other revenue sources.  
In the case of the parks and recreation service, it is less known that how much the 
UCRPARK measure would cover the full cost of the service delivery. However, in 
general, parks and recreation services tend to be more heavily subsidized with general 
taxes or other sources of revenue than sewerage due to the nature of the service’s 
generation of positive externalities and equity consideration for those who can not afford 
the charges for the entry of parks and recreation facilities (Downing, 1992). Nonetheless, 
it should be noted that only 11.3% of sample cities have UCRPARK score 0.4 or higher 
as the Table 3.5 shows. Given that the ICMA’s 2001 survey reports that, on average, user 
charges account for 99.3% (UCRSEW 0.993) of local government annual sewerage 
expenditures and 21.6% (UCRPARK 0.216) of annual parks and recreation expenditures, 
respectively (ICMA, 2002), the sample means (UCRSEW 0.90 and UCRPARK 0.20) in 
this study are very close to the national averages. It should be acknowledged that the 
sample means in this study cover a 33-year period (1972-2004) for municipal 
governments only while the figures of ICMA apply to a single year (2001) and include 
both municipalities and counties.    
Tables 3.6 and 3.7 report the regression results for the impact of user charges on 
total service spending under various model specifications: Models I are run with UCR as 
the primary independent variable; Models II employ four brackets of UCR dummy 




reduction; and Models III use total sewerage charges or parks and recreation charges as 
an effort to avoid the mathematical simultaneity problem that may exist in Models I.9  
As Table 3.6 shows, the statistically significant and negative coefficient on 
UCRSEW (-0.217) in Model I implies that a 10% increase in UCR sewerage leads to a 
2.2% reduction in total sewerage spending. This finding suggests that as the percentage 
(or share) of sewerage charge increases, the total sewerage expenditure decreases. For 
example, suppose a city currently finances 60% of its sewerage expenditure from user 
charges, that is, the UCRSEW for this city is 0.6. If the city increases the degree of its 
user charge reliance and finances 66% of its sewerage expenditure from user charges, its 
sewerage expenditure will decrease by 2.2%. Considering that the average spending on 
sewerage for the sample cities is about $15.39 million annually, the 2.2% reduction 
would imply a saving of $338,580 for the municipal government. As Bierhanzl and 
Downing (1998) points out, the reduction in spending could be attributed to the presence 
of a consumption-payment link and the breaking of a fiscal illusion in the service 
provision and consumption of sewer services.  
Furthermore, the negative and descending coefficients on four different brackets 
of UCRSEW dummy variables in Model II indicate that the higher the UCR sewerage 
level (bracket), the more sewerage expenditure is reduced.10 In general, the finding 
suggests that the magnitude of spending reduction becomes larger when the proportion of 
charge financing increases.  
                                                 
9 Similar analysis has been done on a per capita basis as well, but the models either produced the same 
results with the ones using the total amount of sewerage or parks and recreation charges (when per capita 
charges are logged) or generated very low and meaningless R-square (when per capita charges are 
unlogged). Therefore, these model specifications are not reported. 
10 The coefficients on dummy variables reported in Tables 3.5 and 3.6 are adjusted using a method 
suggested by Kennedy (1981) for binary variables in a semi-logarithmic equation. To calculate the 




In comparison, Model III shows that a 10% increase in the total amount of 
sewerage charges is associated with a 2.5% increase in sewerage spending. This positive 
relationship could occur under the situation that bureaucrats may have incentives to 
provide the charge-financed services at a more-than-needed level when a significant 
surplus of the user charge revenue is available to them. Thus, this finding may serve as 
evidence of budget maximizing behavior on the part of bureaucrats. Alternatively, this 
finding could also be indicative of a flypaper effect. For example, suppose that a city uses 
both general revenue and user charges to fund its sewer service. If the city raises more 
funds for sewer service from user charges in a given year, it might spend even more on 
the service instead of diverting general revenues to other purposes, thus resulting in a 
positive relationship between user charge reliance and government expenditures. 
However, since the direction of the causality could run two-ways, another possible and 
simple explanation could be that an increase in spending requires an increase in user 
charge revenue.  
Table 3.7 shows the regression results of the effects of UCR parks and recreation 
on the level of parks and recreation spending. A similar pattern is repeated here as in the 
spending on sewerage. The result of Model I indicates that a 10% increase in UCRPARK 
leads to a 0.7% reduction in parks and recreation expenditures. The magnitude of the 
reduction effect is smaller than that in the case of sewerage spending. This blunt effect 
may be due to a heavy subsidization of general revenue funding for the parks and 
recreation services. In addition, as with the sewer spending, Model III in Table 3.7 shows 
a positive impact of user charges on expenditures. That is, a 10% increase in the total 




recreation spending. Unlike the results for sewer spending, the negative and descending 
coefficients on four different brackets of UCRPARK dummy variables in Model II fail to 
reach statistical significance at any conventional level, suggesting that the magnitude of 
spending reduction does not vary with the proportion of charge financing in the case of 
parks and recreation service. 
With respect to the control variables, intergovernmental revenue, population, land 
area and percentage of non-white population are positively associated with both sewer 
expenditure and parks and recreation expenditure. The percentage of population at age 
above 65 is positively associated with parks and recreation spending but has no 
statistically significant impact on sewerage spending. Interestingly, the percentage of 
median family income has a positive impact on parks and recreation spending but a 
negative effect on sewerage spending. Another unexpected result is the effect of the 
number of special districts on government spending. Both the number of sewer districts 
and the number of parks and recreation districts show some evidence of positive (rather 
than negative) impacts on expenditures although the impacts are not consistent across 
different model specifications. Moreover, the coefficients on the percentage of owner 
occupied housing fails to reach statistical significance in either sewerage or parks and 
recreation spending.  
 
3.6 Discussion and Suggestions for Future Research 
In summary, the empirical findings in this study are consistent with Bierhanzl and 
Downing’s finding that a greater degree of user charge reliance of the charge-financed 




that the magnitude of spending reduction becomes larger when the proportion of charge 
financing increases as reflected in descending coefficients of four different brackets of 
UCRSEW dummy variables employed in the analysis, but this descending effect is not 
evident for parks and recreation services. Although this study does not measure 
efficiency directly, since the level of government spending has been widely used as a 
proxy for measuring the relative efficiency of municipal service provisions, this study has 
implications for improving the performance and efficiency of government through user 
charge financing.  
This study employs a more elaborate methodology than previous studies, but the 
conclusions made here are still tentative and several issues remain open to further 
research. First of all, having expenditures on both sides of the regression equation may 
bias the results upward. Without sufficient information on the policy making process of 
municipal services, it would be difficult to determine how different financing methods 
affect fiscal outcomes.  
Second, caution must also be exercised in claiming that charge financing and 
higher reliance of charge financing can be more efficient (in terms of allocative 
efficiency) than public provisions financed primarily with tax revenues. Although this 
study included a number of independent variables that may affect government 
expenditures and employed fixed effects regression models to help control for omitted 
variables that remain constant over time but vary across cities, spending in a community 
is related to numerous other factors such as wealth, tax base, government responsiveness, 
implementation of alternative service delivery systems, and quality of service (George A.  




appropriately controlled in order to test the allocative efficiency of service delivery. For 
example, a reduction in spending might be accompanied by a reduction in service quality. 
Without sufficient information on the output of the service, it is not possible to derive any 
definite conclusion on the efficiency gains or losses. Moreover, some states’ statutes 
prohibit local governments from charging more for a service than it costs to provide that 
service (e.g., in California). This is intended to prevent charges from being used as a 
revenue-raising device. However, it is unknown that how many other states have such 
provisions. Also, how to accurately determine the costs is not explained clear in the 
California laws. The practice may vary greatly across states.  
Furthermore, this study has tested only demand function reflecting the 
expenditure level. It would be useful if a cost function were also used to understand 
productive efficiency (technical efficiency) of sewer and parks and recreation services in 
the study (Hirsch, 1965; Uri, 2001). This would require data on output levels and input 
prices. However, public sector output levels are very difficult to measure, and 
information on input costs are hard to collect. Municipalities may not have access to the 
same production technologies. For example, to measure the quality of the service, higher 
staff level or more productive workers may lead to quicker response time to plumbing 
problems; and jurisdictions with better fiscal (taxing) capacity can afford more efficient 
and environmentally-friendly technology and equipments (usually more expensive). 
While the degree of productive efficiency cannot be measured for a given quantity, 
increases in productive efficiency will be reflected in reduced costs of providing the 
service. This can be measured for a municipality as reduced expenditures for a given 




Another concern is that studies examining differences in the level of government 
expenditures are commonly over-aggregated and, consequently, may provide insufficient 
information about the factors that affect the expenditure decisions of a particular 
governmental unit. As indicated above, the lack of an adequate method for extracting and 
measuring quality of service variations creates additional problems. Conducting intensive 
case studies of specific municipalities would enable researchers to collect more accurate 
and more detailed data as well as provide a basis for improved measurements of the value 
of urban services. 
In addition, neighboring cities may act like competitors, affecting each other’s 
spending and financing patterns. The inclusion of the variables accounted for neighbor 
effects are suggested for further analysis. 
Finally, given that this study has tested only two commonly used charge-financed 
services, in order to understand a more accurate relationship between the degree of user 
charge reliance and the expenditure level, similar tests should be conducted for other 





















Parking 119.84 92.89 113.29 121.15
Electricity Supply 96.22 96.75 100.61 103.36
Gas Supply 111.59 105.41 106.72 100.25
Sewerage 46.31 53.10 83.00 92.21
Water Supply 97.18 81.59 86.52 85.90
Airports 61.83 74.00 70.98 80.51
Water Transport 56.80 81.28 115.87 70.01
Hospitals 40.42 66.58 60.76 62.20
Solid Waste Management 23.44 32.82 49.79 58.28
Public Transit 64.65 48.14 33.62 34.44
Parks and Recreation 15.22 17.77 22.21 21.76
Housing and Community  Development 16.90 11.05 14.52 11.96
Highways 3.96 4.85 6.23 5.54
Education 3.70 3.14 2.10 1.57
 
Source: Author’s calculations from U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Finances of Federal, State 





























Table 3.2 Descriptive Statistics of the Sewer Sample 
 
  




Dependent Variable     
     
Sewerage expenditure (mil $) 15.39 53.78 0.002 1,823.47
  
Independent Variables  
  
UCR sewerage (3-year moving average) 0.90 0.86 0 23.51
Sewerage charges (mil $) 11.30 36.16 0 1,068.05
Sewer districts 4 16 0 280
Intergovernmental revenue (mil $) 85.56 786.81 0 23,900
Population  134,444 379,730 25,019 8,084,316
Land area (square miles) 42.44 71.62 1.00 765.70
Median family income 44,432 13,901 14,409 141,964
Owner-occupied house (%) 57.34 11.96 13.40 93.90
Age above 65 (%) 12.04 4.05 1.50 51.80
None-white population (%) 19.47 17.75 0 98.80
 
































Mean Std. Dev. Min. 
 
Max.
     
Dependent Variable      
     
Parks and recreation expenditure (mil $) 11.05 30.53 0.002 719.43
  
Independent Variables  
  
UCR park (3-year moving average) 0.20 0.18 0 2.17
Parks and recreation charges (mil $) 2.23 5.56 0 157.64
Park districts 2 9 0 94
Intergovernmental revenue (mil $) 81.71 758.89 0 23,900
Population  130,948 366,785 25,019 8,084,316
Land area (square miles) 43.36 91.66 1.00 1,732.00
Median family income 44,551 14,021 14,409 141,964
Owner-occupied house (%) 57.23 12.04 13.40 93.90
Age above 65 (%) 12.02 4.14 1.50 51.80
None-white population (%) 20.21 17.99 0 98.40
 





































Max. # of observations
UCRSEW 0.90 0.86 0 23.51 20,402 (100%)
UCRSEW 0-0.5         5,256 (25.8%)
UCRSEW 0.5-1.0         7,353 (36.0%)
UCRSEW 1.0-1.5         5,680 (27.8%)
UCRSEW 1.5-2.0         1,369 (6.7%)
UCRSEW 2.0 or higher          744 (3.7%)
 
Note: UCRSEW is a three-year moving average derived from 686 samples cities for 33 years 














































Max. # of observations
UCRPARK 0.20 0.18 0 2.17 21,955 (100%)
UCRPARK 0-0.1         7,367 (33.5%)
UCRPARK 0.1-0.2         5,655 (25.8%)
UCRPARK 0.2-0.3         4,060 (18.5%)
UCRPARK 0.3-0.4         2,383 (10.9%)
UCRPARK 0.4 or higher         2,490 (11.3%)
 
Note: UCRPARK is a three-year moving average derived from 715 samples cities for 33 years 















































UCRSEW (ln) -0.217     
  (0.031)***     
    
UCRSEW 0.5-1.0   -0.121   
    (0.050)**   
    
UCRSEW 1.0-1.5   -0.313   
    (0.059)***   
    
UCRSEW 1.5-2.0   -0.513   
    (0.078)***   
    
UCRSEW 2.0 and higher   -0.855   
    (0.103)***   
    
Sewerage charges (ln)     0.252 
      (0.024)*** 
    
Sewer districts (ln) 0.038 0.053 0.031 
  (0.028) (0.029)* (0.025) 
    
IGR (ln) 0.123 0.152 0.160 
  (0.028)*** (0.030)*** (0.026)*** 
    
Population (ln) 0.786 0.797 0.597 
  (0.115)*** (0.130)*** (0.109)*** 
    
Land area (ln) 0.303 0.304 0.070 
  (0.126)** (0.132)** (0.111) 
    
Median family income (ln) -0.289 -0.184 -0.164 
  (0.055)*** (0.055)*** (0.051)*** 
    
% Owner-occupied housing (ln) -0.244 -0.158 -0.417 
  (0.358) (0.348) (0.295) 
    
% Age 65 (ln) 0.125 0.057 0.051 
  (0.094) (0.101) (0.090) 
    
% Non-white (ln) 0.293 0.253 0.087 
  (0.035)*** (0.036)*** (0.025)*** 
    
Intercept 0.475 -1.000 1.000 




        
R-square 0.439 0.415 0.618 
 
Note: Total 20,402 observations. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering within 
municipalities; * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; and *** significant at 












































Table 3.7 Effects of Reliance on Parks and Recreation Charges on Total Parks and 










UCRPARK (ln) -0.074     
  (0.026)***     
    
UCRPARK 0.1-0.2   -0.027   
    (0.039)   
    
UCRPARK 0.2-0.3   -0.073   
    (0.049)   
    
UCRPARK 0.3-0.4   -0.076   
    (0.063)   
    
UCRPARK 0.4 and higher   -0.085   
    (0.083)   
    
Parks and recreation charges (ln)     0.212 
      (0.020)*** 
    
Park districts (ln) 0.066 0.059 0.011 
  (0.032)** (0.033)* (0.026) 
    
IGR (ln) 0.143 0.178 0.129 
  (0.038)*** (0.041)*** (0.032)*** 
    
Population (ln) 0.785 0.816 0.458 
  (0.132)*** (0.129)*** (0.111)*** 
    
Land area (ln) 0.426 0.439 0.292 
  (0.129)*** (0.126)*** (0.097)*** 
    
Median family income (ln) 0.087 0.044 0.094 
  (0.043)** (0.050) (0.038)** 
    
% Owner-occupied housing (ln) 0.500 0.335 0.210 
  (0.344) (0.354) (0.296) 
    
% Age 65 (ln) 0.198 0.226 -0.035 
  (0.079)** (0.084)*** (0.072) 
    
% Non-white (ln) 0.065 0.063 0.026 
  (0.025)** (0.027)** (0.022) 
    




  (2.311)*** (2.297)*** (1.907) 
        
R-square 0.557 0.473 0.721 
 
Note: Total 21,955 observations. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering within 
municipalities; * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; and *** significant at 







Chapter 4: Conclusion and Policy Implications 
The main objective of this dissertation is to shed light on the causes and 
consequences of the increased utilization of user charges by American municipal 
governments since the late 1970s. To achieve this objective, the preceding chapters 
examined the effects of TELs on municipal user charge reliance and the impacts of user 
charge financing on the level of government expenditures. In this final chapter, I 
summarize key results, discuss relevant policy implications, and suggest directions for 
future research.  
Following a brief introduction in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 began with the observation 
that since the late 1970s and early 1980s when the massive enactment of state-imposed 
TELs took place, the share of user charges in municipal own-source revenues increased 
dramatically. Therefore, the goal of the second chapter was to investigate whether the 
implementation of this fiscal policy facilitated or motivated the growing trend in 
municipal reliance on user charges. As one of the first empirical analyses that relate the 
state-imposed TELs directly to municipal user charges, this study finds strong support for 
the notion that TELs are in fact one of the determinants of the increasing reliance on 
municipal user charges. Using a nationwide sample of 724 cities over the period of 1970 
through 2004, I find that cities with TELs, on average, collect about $130 more in per 
capita user charges than do cities without TELs, holding all others constant. When the 
potential endogeneity of TELs is taken into consideration the effect becomes even more 
striking. The 2SLS fixed effects model predicts that the implementation of TELs leads to 
an increase of approximately $1,080 in per capita user charges. The 2SLS estimates also 




in total municipal own-source revenue although such effect is not statistically significant 
under the OLS with fixed effects model which assumes that TELs are an exogenous 
event. These findings suggest that previous studies on TELs that have neglected the 
endogeneity of this policy may have seriously underestimated its impact on municipal 
fiscal outcomes. Some unobserved factors further decrease the amount of user charges 
and thus counteract the positive effect of the TEL policy. 
To account for heterogeneity across cities, the basic model has been applied to 
two subsamples—a sample of 65 large cities with populations of at least 250,000 persons 
and a sample of 100 small cities with populations of between 25,000 and 50,000 persons. 
The positive effect of TELs on per capita user charges is supported in both large-city and 
small-city samples using either OLS or 2SLS approach, but the effect of TELs on the 
share of user charges is uncertain in both subsamples.  
When the stringency or restrictiveness of the TEL policy is taken into 
consideration, the results show that potentially binding TELs increase per capita user 
charges by $76 in the full sample, by $114 in the large-city sample, and by $43 in the 
small-city sample. There is also evidence that potentially binding TELs increase user 
charge percentage in the large and small cities. Non-binding TELs, on the other hand, are 
associated with increases in per capita user charges in large and small cities but not in the 
full sample. There is no indication that non-binding TELs affect user charges as a 
percentage of own-source revenue. Therefore, one can conclude that the restrictiveness of 
TELs matters when the share of user charges is the primary interest. Nonetheless, it is not 
necessarily true that potentially binding TELs always have a greater effect on user charge 




increases in the dollar amount of user charges and their impacts are not statistically 
distinguishable in large and small cities. In this sense, the classification of potentially 
binding or non-binding limitations seems more a reflection of public attitude toward 
municipal taxing and spending levels than a fiscal ceiling as the theory might have 
suggested. Furthermore, the finding that potentially binding TELs increase the share of 
user charges in large and small cities is somewhat different from previous studies which 
suggested that potentially binding TELs initially decrease local user charges and 
miscellaneous revenue as a share of local general revenue (including all units of local 
governments) but eventually increase the share over time (Mullins & Joyce, 1996).  
In addition, this study also extends the literature by testing the effect of specific 
types of TELs on user charge reliance. To date, no existing studies have yet been found to 
evaluate the individual effect of the seven types of TELs. Since both previous research 
and this study suggest that the restrictiveness of TELs matters, detailed examination of 
each specific type of TELs could further our understanding on the fiscal impact of the 
policy. Estimates from the OLS with fixed effects model using the full sample, large-city 
sample and small-city sample reveal that specific types of TELs generate varying effects 
on user charge reliance with some limitations showing a negative effect while others a 
positive effect. In general, specific property tax rate limits and full disclosure appear to 
have greater overall effects than do others. That is, specific property tax rate limits lead to 
an increase in per capita user charges by $88 in the full sample, by $61 in the large-city 
sample, and by $109 in the small-city sample; and to an increase in user charges as a 
percentage of own-source revenue by 1.4 percentage points in large cities. Full disclosure 




sample, and by $119 in the small-city sample. Although, as mentioned above, previous 
studies have not examined the individual effect of TELs, in their analyses of the 
restrictiveness of TELs, these studies have excluded full disclosure from any of the 
categories based on the assumption that this type of limitation is “procedural rather than 
revenue or expenditure focus” and, accordingly, relatively non-constraining in nature 
(Joyce & Mullins, 1991; Mullins, 2004, p. 123; Mullins & Joyce, 1996). Since the present 
analysis has demonstrated the importance of full disclosure on municipal user charge 
reliance, previous studies that excluded full disclosure from the analysis of non-binding 
TELs may have produced biased results due to measurement errors. 
Finally, an expanded analysis among the 724 cities between 1970 and 2004 
reveals that the larger the number of the limitations, the greater the amount of per capita 
user charges a city collects. The magnitude of the effect is larger under the 2SLS model 
than under the OLS model. The OLS result also shows that the share of user charges in 
municipal own-source revenue decreases as the number of limitations increases and the 
relationship reverses when the number of limitations reaches three. However, this finding 
is not supported using the 2SLS approach. 
The analysis of the causes of the increased utilization of user charges invited an 
investigation of the consequences of such changes in revenue mechanisms. This formed 
the purpose of Chapter 3. With a focus on two specific public programs—the sewer 
service and parks and recreation service, Chapter 3 examined a panel of 686 
municipalities for the sewer service and 715 cities for the parks and recreation service 
with populations over 25,000 for the period of 1972 through 2004. Following Bierhanzl 




user charges in total sewerage spending leads to a 2.2% reduction in total sewerage 
spending, and that this reduction effect is also found in parks and recreation services 
although the magnitude of the effect is smaller (a 1% reduction). These findings are 
basically consistent with previous studies. In addition, this study also finds that municipal 
expenditure levels and total dollar amount of a specific charge revenue is positively 
correlated with each other. This result may still serve as evidence of possible budget 
maximizing behavior on the part of bureaucrats or an indication of a flypaper effect.  
The results of this dissertation research raise several broad policy implications. 
One of the primary implications of this study is that state-imposed TELs have profound 
influences on municipal revenue structures. In particular, TELs have substantially 
augmented the utilization of user charges in municipalities and may lead to a bigger 
government. These influences could be unintended consequences for many states. In a 
democratic society, TELs may serve as a means to protect the general public from 
excessive levels of government spending and taxing that are higher than the public 
actually prefers or needs. On that part of public officials, TELs also perform the function 
of promoting political accountability in governments. However, when this fiscal 
institution is imposed by a higher level of government (originated either through voters or 
legislators) on a lower level of government, for example, imposed by a state government 
on municipal governments within the state, local political autonomy in terms of taxing 
and spending authorities may be hindered.  
In the United States, municipalities, along with other units of local governments, 
are legal creatures of the states, directly or indirectly, established in accordance with state 




which asserts that municipalities only have the powers that are expressly granted to them 
by the state legislature—that is, those powers that are necessarily implied from that grant 
of power and those that are essential and indispensable to the municipality's existence and 
functioning. Any ambiguities in the legislative grant of power should be resolved against 
the municipality according to the Dillon’s Rule (Frug, Ford, & Barron, 2006). This 
implies that local communities must derive their powers from the state rather than the 
local electorate and the state can expend or contract these same powers at any given time. 
In particular, Dillon’s Rule is considered a critical limitation on local government fiscal 
activity. Although several states have altered Dillon’s Rule by granting “home rule” 
charter powers to certain localities, including municipalities, where local governments 
can act in all areas unless state law specifically prohibits those actions, fiscal activities of 
local governments often fall into the most restricted areas (Mikesell, 2007).  
Due to different social, political, and economic characteristics, the fifty states vary 
widely in the way they exercise control or oversight over local governments. Some states 
have granted local governments extensive discretionary authority, whereas others treat 
local governments simply as appendages of the state governments (Krane, Hill, & Rigos, 
2001). Municipal governments, on one hand, must operate within the legal boundaries set 
by the states, which constrain their ability to raise revenue; on the other hand, there is a 
request to practice local autonomy, especially fiscal autonomy, in order to effectively or 
efficiently respond to the needs of their residents. Supporters of localism claim that local 
governments are the most efficient providers of certain public services. As service 
providers, municipal governments must have the necessary discretion to raise revenues 




(Bird, 1993). Moreover, since local governments are closer to their citizens, they can 
better reflect citizen desires and encourage them to participate in public affairs, thus, 
promoting democratic values and practices (Brunori, 2003; Frug, 1980). Some scholars 
propose that local governments should not only be permitted to access various revenue 
sources, but also be encouraged to exploit the sources that are best equipped for them. 
Nevertheless, caution must be exercised that municipal revenue generation should not 
seriously undercut the revenue base of state governments, especially those tax bases that 
generate state revenues for dealing with cross-jurisdictional issues such as income 
inequalities, environmental protection, and so forth. 
During an era of tax and expenditure limitations when the traditional local 
revenue source—property taxes—have been severely constrained, the revenue potential 
of user charges makes this financing mechanism especially attractive to these fiscally 
challenged local government officials. User charges are one of the few areas in which 
most municipal governments can still autonomously exercise their taxing authorities 
without significant state government interventions. An adequate level of utilization of 
user charges can provide a robust source of revenue that is generally accepted by voters 
and politicians. The increased reliance on user charges can also further diversify 
municipal revenue sources and help improve fiscal performance by stabilizing revenue 
streams and reducing the risks associated with dependence on one or a few revenue 
sources. Although user charges themselves may be more volatile in the revenue stream 
over the business cycle, they may be able to vary in ways that counter other forms of 
local revenues. Having volatile sources of revenue and few options for alternative 




brought about by economic downturns, intense competition, and changing public 
demands. Public programs and activities that are largely self-supported by user charges 
are less likely to suffer the inevitable budget cuts and reductions in services that occur 
during periods of fiscal austerity. In this sense, a diversified revenue structure with an 
adequate level of utilization of user charges can avoid or alleviate such risk and 
strengthen local control over taxing and spending decisions instead of seeking support 
through increased state aid. 
The preceding analysis also suggests that user charge financing could lead to 
lower level of public expenditure than the tax financing method. With a proper pricing 
structure, user charges can provide a clear demand signal to decision makers in the public 
sector and assist them in deciding what to produce, how to produce it, and for whom to 
produce it. User charges can also enable the consumers to see a direct connection 
between the payment rendered and service received, thus reducing the possibility of 
overconsumption of publicly provided goods and services. However, care must be taken 
to ensure that low-income persons are not adversely affected by user charge systems. One 
suggestion offered by ACIR is to use a combination of general taxation and user charges 
to finance specific services so that a subsidy from general revenues can be provided to 
disadvantaged individuals or groups of consumers while other consumers paying the full 
price of services. However, some argue that government subsidy is not a good solution 
since all users of the service benefit regardless of economic status or needs. A better 
solution, as they proposed, is to charge a price for public service and then adjust that 
price in consideration of special circumstances such as a low or zero price for minimal 




discounts offered to target groups or varying charges based on median family income in a 
neighborhood (Pascal, 1984; Zorn, 1991). Overall, a responsive government must ensure 
that user charges are implemented efficiently, equitably, and effectively.  
Since a number of questions are beyond the scope of this study, further research is 
necessary to fully understand the causes and consequences of user charge reliance. For 
instance, how do municipal governments make decisions in selecting charge financed 
services? What are the political obstacles in implementing user charges? How does 
intergovernmental competition affect user charge reliance? Has the quality of service 
been improved under the charge financing system? Does municipal revenue system 
become more regressive with increased use of user charges? These questions point the 











Appendix A: Supplemental Information for Chapter 2 
Table A.1 Number of Municipalities in the Samples by Year 
 




1970 722 65 100 
1971 724 65 100 
1972 724 65 100 
1973 721 64 98 
1974 723 65 99 
1975 724 65 100 
1976 724 65 100 
1977 723 65 99 
1978 721 65 100 
1979 724 65 100 
1980 724 65 100 
1981 723 65 100 
1982 724 65 100 
1983 722 65 100 
1984 719 65 100 
1985 722 65 100 
1986 720 64 100 
1987 721 65 100 
1988 722 65 100 
1989 708 65 97 
1990 708 65 97 
1991 710 65 97 
1992 724 65 100 
1993 662 65 85 
1994 661 65 85 
1995 660 65 86 
1996 660 65 86 
1997 719 65 100 
1998 496 65 86 
1999 496 65 86 
2000 467 65 82 
2001 328 65 26 
2002 506 65 88 
2003 322 65 23 
2004 458 65 100 
    





Table A.2 Number of Municipalities in the Sample by State 
 




Alabama South 13 0 3 
Alaska West 1 1 0 
Arizona West 8 3 0 
Arkansas South 8 0 0 
California West 110 13 2 
Colorado West 11 3 0 
Connecticut Northeast 16 0 4 
Delaware South 1 0 0 
Florida South 27 3 3 
Georgia South 12 1 3 
Hawaii West 1 1 0 
Idaho West 4 0 0 
Illinois Midwest 46 1 3 
Indiana Midwest 19 0 3 
Iowa Midwest 15 0 3 
Kansas Midwest 9 1 2 
Kentucky South 6 2 0 
Louisiana South 10 2 1 
Maine Northeast 3 0 0 
Maryland South 4 1 1 
Massachusetts Northeast 35 1 11 
Michigan Midwest 38 1 8 
Minnesota Midwest 19 2 5 
Mississippi South 7 0 1 
Missouri Midwest 14 2 3 
Montana  West 3 0 0 
Nebraska Midwest 3 1 0 
Nevada West 3 1 0 
New Hampshire Northeast 3 0 1 
New Jersey Northeast 26 1 8 
New Mexico West 6 0 0 
New York Northeast 26 2 1 
North Carolina South 15 2 3 
North Dakota Midwest 4 0 0 
Ohio Midwest 38 4 11 
Oklahoma South 11 2 3 
Oregon West 6 1 1 
Pennsylvania Northeast 19 2 3 
Rhode Island Northeast 7 0 0 
South Carolina South 7 0 1 
South Dakota Midwest 2 0 0 
Tennessee South 9 1 1 
Texas South 41 7 0 
Utah West 5 0 1 




Virginia South 12 1 0 
Washington West 11 1 1 
West Virginia South 5 0 1 
Wisconsin Midwest 22 1 8 
Wyoming West 2 0 0 
     












































Table A.3 TELs and User Charges by Region, 2004 
 
  








































User charges, total ($mil) $175.8 $65.4 $167.6 $185.3 $143.2
  
User charges, per capita ($) $506.4 $520.4 $945.0 $674.8 $673.6
  
User charges, % of own-
source revenue 28.3% 39.1% 48.1% 39.4% 39.8%
 
Note: Numbers in parentheses indicate percentage of total (458) sample cities or percentage of 
cities in each region in 2004. 
 



























Table A.4 Number of Cities with Populations Over 25,000 in 2004 
 
Regions Total Cities with TELs Percentage 
Northeast 161 134 83% 
Midwest 344 302 88% 
South 354 351 99% 
West 388 387 100% 
 
Total 1,247 1,174 94% 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from the 2002 Census of Governments, Volume 1, Number 1, 






































Table A.5 Descriptive Statistics of the Large-City Subsample 
 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Dependent Variables      
     
User charges per capita ($) 581.87 496.04 28.37 2957.41
User charges as % of own-
source revenue 37.34 16.38 2.96 82.06
     
Independent Variables     
     
TELs 0.89 0.32 0.00 1.00
Number of TELs 2.01 1.25 0.00 5.00
Potentially binding TELs 0.61 0.49 0.00 1.00
Non-binding TELs 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00
Overall property tax rate limits 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00
Specific property tax rate limits 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00
Property tax levy limits 0.38 0.49 0.00 1.00
Assessment increase limits 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00
General revenue limits 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00
General expenditure limits 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00
Full disclosure 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00
Taxes per capita ($) 662.81 403.10 129.15 3547.66
Taxes percentage (%) 49.50 16.31 10.79 90.20
IGR per capita ($) 513.59 557.22 0.93 3142.87
IGR percentage (%) 23.95 13.81 0.14 76.07
Debt per capita ($) 2671.64 1915.01 37.43 12846.18
Debt percentage (%) 188.06 88.74 9.33 738.28
Expenditure mix (%) 40.98 14.49 5.79 85.28
Optional tax 0.98 0.15 0.00 1.00
Special districts 40.25 59.39 0.00 465.00
Population 670158.40 1015743.00 48081.00 8084316.00
Per capita income ($) 19265.86 4274.34 8855.00 49736.00
Council-manager city 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00
  
Instrumental Variables  
  
Passage rate 0.22 0.28 0 1
Land area (square miles) 180.07 225.33 23.50 1732.00
Business receipts (mil$) 67075.02 132386.20 1421.93 1623416.00
Unemployment rate (%) 6.12 2.48 1.80 18.50
Non-white (%) 31.97 17.25 1.00 87.70
Age 18 and under (%) 26.12 3.49 14.60 35.00
Age 65 and over (%) 10.80 3.04 2.00 17.90
Owner-occupied housing (%) 51.36 9.78 20.50 70.00
Central city 0.98 0.12 0.00 1.00
 




Table A.6 Descriptive Statistics of the Small-City Subsample 
 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Dependent Variables   
  
User charges per capita ($) 501.34 577.03 1.75 4167.22
User charges as % of own-
source revenue 37.31 21.56 0.51 91.14
  
Independent Variables  
  
TELs 0.77 0.42 0.00 1.00
Number of TELs 1.35 1.00 0.00 4.00
Potentially binding TELs 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00
Non-binding TELs 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00
Overall property tax rate limits 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00
Specific property tax rate limits 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00
Property tax levy limits 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00
Assessment increase limits 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00
General revenue limits 0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00
General expenditure limits 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00
Full disclosure 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00
Taxes per capita ($) 548.28 394.60 16.24 3422.31
Taxes percentage (%) 50.18 21.96 3.40 98.79
IGR per capita ($) 365.79 323.88 0.00 2661.74
IGR percentage (%) 23.78 13.19 0.00 87.60
Debt per capita ($) 1460.27 1638.50 0.00 14946.14
Debt percentage (%) 135.89 127.47 0.00 2825.37
Expenditure mix (%) 38.49 18.72 3.08 98.45
Optional tax 0.63 0.48 0.00 1.00
Special districts 18.71 21.03 0.00 196.00
Population 36890.48 7535.85 25067.00 74315.00
Per capita income ($) 19629.28 6766.88 9918.00 80149.00
Council-manager city 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00
  
Instrumental Variables  
  
Passage rate 0.16 0.28 0 1
Land area (square miles) 17.49 12.53 1.00 85.60
Business receipts (mil$) 5361.98 9963.46 56.36 147846.10
Unemployment rate (%) 6.00 2.99 0.70 20.50
Non-white (%) 12.52 14.15 0.10 83.90
Age 18 and under (%) 25.14 3.59 10.50 39.70
Age 65 and over (%) 13.09 3.57 3.00 21.50
Owner-occupied housing (%) 61.21 12.45 13.40 93.90
Central city 0.43 0.50 0.00 1.00
 




Table A.7 Effects of TELs on User Charge Reliance in 724 Sample Cities, 1970-1997 
(TELs treated exogenously) 
 
  (1) (2) 
 User Charges User Charge 
  Per Capita Percentage 
TELs 119.180 -0.135 
 (36.073)*** (0.497) 
   
Taxes ª 0.269 -0.529 
 (0.066)*** (0.037)*** 
   
IGR ª 0.053 0.033 
 (0.030)* (0.012)*** 
   
Debt ª  0.037 -0.016 
 (0.013)*** (0.002)*** 
   
Expenditure mix (%) 8.588 0.191 
 (1.415)*** (0.022)*** 
   
Optional tax 96.943 1.056 
 (25.473)*** (0.608)* 
   
Special districts 0.139 0.011 
 (0.351) (0.004)** 
   
Population (ln) 131.393 -1.097 
 (71.413)* (1.094) 
   
Per capita income (ln) -108.830 1.372 
  (44.853)** (0.681)** 
   
Council-manager city 7.573 -0.466 
 (27.110) (0.610) 
   
Constant  -597.981 56.837 
 (742.289) (12.070)*** 
   
R-square 0.397 0.868 
 
Note: Total 19,939 observations. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering within 
states; * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; and *** significant at the 1% 
level. All specifications include city-fixed effects. 
 
ª Taxes per capita, IGR per capita, and debt per capita for column (1); taxes percentage, IGR 






Table A.8 Effects of TELs on User Charge Reliance in 724 Sample Cities, 1970-1997 
(TELs treated endogenously) 
 
  (1) (2) 
 User Charges  User Charge  
 Per Capita Percentage 
TELs 547.763  2.211  
 (257.483)** (1.471) 
   
Taxes ª -0.110  -0.413  
 (0.518) (0.130)*** 
   
IGR ª -0.239  -0.136  
 (0.516) (0.104) 
   
Debt ª  0.059  -0.013  
 (0.024)** (0.002)*** 
   
Expenditure mix (%) -46.193  -0.191  
 (32.840) (0.207) 
   
Optional tax 71.673  0.651  
 (62.114) (1.348) 
   
Special districts -1.054  0.003  
 (0.778) (0.010) 
   
Population (ln) -157.157  -4.096  
 (164.655) (1.554)*** 
   
Per capita income (ln) 15.712  0.316  
 (62.384) (1.232) 
   
Council-manager city -49.751  -1.075  
 (77.658) (1.072) 
      
First-stage F-statistic 14.290  13.510  
   
Overidentifying restrictions  8.443  11.453  
J-test and p-value (0.133) (0.043)** 
   
Hausman endogeneity test 109.720*** 79.990*** 
   
Endogenous variables TELs, Taxes, IGR, and Expenditure mix 




Passage rate, Land area (ln), Business receipts 
(ln), Unemployment rate, Non-white, Age 18, 





Note: Total 19,939 observations. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering within 
states; * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; and *** significant at the 1% 
level. All specifications include city-fixed effects. 
 
ª Taxes per capita, IGR per capita, and debt per capita for column (1); taxes percentage, IGR 





Appendix B: Supplemental Information for Chapter 3 




Number of Cities for Sewer 
Service 
Number of Cities for Parks 
and Recreation Service 
1972 677 698 
1973 677 696 
1974 686 704 
1975 680 704 
1976 675 703 
1977 667 707 
1978 664 715 
1979 666 707 
1980 663 707 
1981 657 703 
1982 648 702 
1983 651 706 
1984 640 697 
1985 644 702 
1986 621 700 
1987 629 697 
1988 618 700 
1989 611 689 
1990 626 690 
1991 633 691 
1992 647 703 
1993 597 640 
1994 603 641 
1995 592 639 
1996 598 642 
1997 651 699 
1998 599 644 
1999 602 644 
2000 569 612 
2001 377 415 
2002 615 667 
2003 365 400 
2004 556 598 
   














Number of Cities for 
Sewer Service 
Number of Cities for 
Parks and Recreation 
Service 
Alabama South 12 13 
Alaska West 0 1 
Arizona West 8 8 
Arkansas South 7 8 
California West 88 110 
Colorado West 10 11 
Connecticut Northeast 17 16 
Delaware South 1 1 
Florida South 27 27 
Georgia South 12 12 
Hawaii West 1 1 
Idaho West 4 4 
Illinois Midwest 41 37 
Indiana Midwest 19 19 
Iowa Midwest 15 15 
Kansas Midwest 9 9 
Kentucky South 6 6 
Louisiana South 10 10 
Maine Northeast 3 3 
Maryland South 4 4 
Massachusetts Northeast 33 35 
Michigan Midwest 38 38 
Minnesota Midwest 19 19 
Mississippi South 7 7 
Missouri Midwest 11 14 
Montana  West 3 3 
Nebraska Midwest 3 3 
Nevada West 3 3 
New Hampshire Northeast 3 3 
New Jersey Northeast 24 27 
New Mexico West 6 6 
New York Northeast 25 26 
North Carolina South 13 15 
North Dakota Midwest 4 4 
Ohio Midwest 38 38 
Oklahoma South 11 11 
Oregon West 6 5 
Pennsylvania Northeast 21 19 
Rhode Island Northeast 7 7 
South Carolina South 7 7 
South Dakota Midwest 2 2 
Tennessee South 9 9 
Texas South 41 41 




Vermont Northeast 1 1 
Virginia South 12 12 
Washington West 11 11 
West Virginia South 5 5 
Wisconsin Midwest 22 22 
Wyoming West 2 2 
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